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Abstract
A Stackelberg game is played between a leader and a follower. The leader first chooses an action,
then the follower plays his best response. The goal of the leader is to pick the action that will maximize
his payoff given the follower’s best response. In this paper we present an approach to solving for the
leader’s optimal strategy in certain Stackelberg games where the follower’s utility function (and thus the
subsequent best response of the follower) is unknown.
Stackelberg games capture, for example, the following interaction between a producer and a con-
sumer. The producer chooses the prices of the goods he produces, and then a consumer chooses to
buy a utility maximizing bundle of goods. The goal of the seller here is to set prices to maximize his
profit—his revenue, minus the production cost of the purchased bundle. It is quite natural that the seller
in this example should not know the buyer’s utility function. However, he does have access to revealed
preference feedback—he can set prices, and then observe the purchased bundle and his own profit. We
give algorithms for efficiently solving, in terms of both computational and query complexity, a broad
class of Stackelberg games in which the follower’s utility function is unknown, using only “revealed
preference” access to it. This class includes in particular the profit maximization problem, as well as
the optimal tolling problem in nonatomic congestion games, when the latency functions are unknown.
Surprisingly, we are able to solve these problems even though the optimization problems are non-convex
in the leader’s actions.
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1 Introduction
Consider the following two natural problems:
1. Profit Maximization via Revealed Preferences: A retailer, who sells d goods, repeatedly interacts
with a buyer. In each interaction, the retailer decides how to price the d goods by choosing p ∈ Rd+,
and in response, the buyer purchases the bundle x ∈ Rd+ that maximizes her utility v(x) − 〈x, p〉,
where v is an unknown concave valuation function. The retailer observes the bundle purchased, and
therefore his profit, which is 〈x, p〉 − c(x), where c is an unknown convex cost function. The retailer
would like to set prices that maximize his profit after only a polynomial number of interactions with
the buyer.
2. Optimal Tolling via Revealed Behavior: A municipal authority administers m roads that form a
network G = (V,E). Each road e ∈ E of the network has an unknown latency function ℓe : R+ →
R+ which determines the time it takes to traverse the road given a level of congestion. The authority
has the power to set constant tolls τe ∈ R+ on the roads in an attempt to manipulate traffic flow. In
rounds, the authority sets tolls, and then observes the Nash equilibrium flow induced by the non-atomic
network congestion game defined by the unknown latency functions and the tolls, together with the
social cost (average total latency) of the flow. The authority would like to set tolls that minimize the
social cost after only a polynomial number of rounds.
Although these problems are quite different, they share at least one important feature—the retailer and
the municipal authority each wish to optimize an unknown objective function given only query access to
it. That is, they have the power to choose some set of prices or tolls, and then observe the value of their
objective function that results from that choice. This kind of problem (alternately called bandit or zeroth
order optimization) is well-studied, and is well understood in cases in which the unknown objective being
maximized (resp. minimized) is concave (resp. convex). Unfortunately, the two problems posed above
share another important feature—when posed as bandit optimization problems, the objective function being
maximized (resp. minimized) is generally not concave (resp. convex). For the profit maximization problem,
even simple instances lead to a non concave objective function.
Example 1. Consider a setting with one good (d = 1). The buyer’s valuation function v(x) = √x, and the
retailer’s cost function is c(x) = x. The buyer’s utility for buying x units at price p is √x − x · p. Thus, if
the price is p, a utility-maximizing buyer will purchase x∗(p) = 1
4p2
units. The profit of the retailer is then
Profit(p) = p · x∗(p)− c(x∗(p)) = 1
4p
− 1
4p2
.
Unfortunately, this profit function is not concave.
Since the retailer’s profit function is not concave in the prices, it cannot be optimized efficiently using
generic methods for concave maximization. This phenomenon persists into higher dimensions, where it
is not clear how to efficiently maximize the non-concave objective. The welfare objective in the tolling
problem is also non-convex in the tolls. We give an example in Appendix A.
Surprisingly, despite this non-convexity, we show that both of these problems can be solved efficiently
subject to certain mild conditions. More generally, we show how to solve a large family of Stackelberg
games in which the utility function of the “follower” is unknown. A Stackelberg game is played by a
leader and a follower. The leader moves first and commits to an action (e.g., setting prices or tolls as in
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our examples), and then the follower best responds, playing the action that maximizes her utility given the
leader’s action. The leader’s problem is to find the action that will optimize his objective (e.g., maximizing
profit, or minimizing social cost as in our examples) after the follower best responds to this action.
Traditionally, Stackelberg games are solved assuming that the leader knows the follower’s utility func-
tion, and thus his own utility function. But this assumption is very strong, and in many realistic settings
the follower’s utility function will be unknown. Our results give general conditions—and several natural
examples—under which the problem of computing an optimal Stackelberg equilibrium can be solved effi-
ciently with only revealed preferences feedback to the follower’s utility function.
For clarity of exposition, we first work out our solution in detail for the special case of profit maximiza-
tion from revealed preferences.We then derive and state our general theorem for optimally solving a class of
Stackelberg games where the follower’s utility is unknown. Finally, we show how to apply the general theo-
rem to other problems, including the optimal tolling problem mentioned above and a natural principal-agent
problem.
1.1 Our Results and Techniques
The main challenge in solving our class of Stackelberg games is that for many natural examples, the leader’s
objective function is not concave when written as a function of his own action. For instance, in our example,
the retailer’s profit is not concave as a function of the price he sets. Our first key ingredient is to show that in
many natural settings, the leader’s objective is concave when written as a function of the follower’s action.
Consider again the retailer’s profit maximization problem. Recall that if the buyer’s valuation function
v(x) =
√
x, then when she faces a price p, she will buy the bundle x∗(p) = 1/4p2. In this simple case, we
can see that setting a price of p∗(x) = 1/2
√
x will induce the buyer to purchase x units. In principle, we
can now write the retailer’s profit function as a function of the bundle x. In our example, the retailer’s cost
function is simply c(x) = x. So,
Profit(x) = p∗(x) · x− c(x) =
√
x
2
− x.
Written in terms of x, the profit function is concave! As we show, this phenomenon continues in higher
dimensions, for arbitrary convex cost functions c and for a wide class of concave valuation functions sat-
isfying certain technical conditions, including the well studied families of CES and Cobb-Douglas utility
functions.
Thus, if the retailer had access to an oracle for the concave function Profit(x), we could use an algorithm
for bandit concave optimization to maximize the retailer’s profit. Unfortunately, the retailer does not directly
get to choose the bundle purchased by the buyer and observe the profit for that bundle: he can only set prices
and observe the buyer’s chosen bundle x∗(p) at those prices, and the resulting profit Profit(x∗(p)).
Nevertheless, we have reduced the retailer’s problem to a possibly simpler one. In order to find the
profit maximizing prices, it suffices to give an algorithm which simulates access to an oracle for Profit(x)
given only the retailer’s query access to x∗(p) and Profit(x∗(p)). Specifically, if for a given bundle x, the
retailer could find prices p such that the buyer’s chosen bundle x∗(p) = x, then he could simulate access to
Profit(x) by setting prices p and receiving Profit(x∗(p)) = Profit(x).
Our next key ingredient is a “taˆtonnement-like” procedure that efficiently finds prices that approximately
induce a target bundle x given only access to x∗(p), provided that the buyer’s valuation function is Ho¨lder
continuous and strongly concave on the set of feasible bundles. Specifically, given a target bundle x, our
procedure finds prices p such that |Profit(x∗(p)) − Profit(x)| ≤ ε. Thus, we can use our procedure to
simulate approximate access to the function Profit(x). Our procedure requires only poly(d, 1/ε) queries
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to x∗(p). Using recent algorithms for bandit optimization due to Belloni et al. [BLNR15], we can maxi-
mize the retailer’s profits efficiently even with only approximate access to Profit(x). When our algorithms
receive noiseless feedback, we can improve the dependence on the approximation parameter ε to be only
poly(log 1/ε).
A similar approach can be used to solve the optimal tolling problem assuming the unknown latency func-
tions are convex and strictly increasing. As in the preceding example, the municipal authority’s objective
function (social cost) is not convex in the tolls, but is convex in the induced flow. Whenever the latency
function are strictly increasing, the potential function of the routing game is strongly convex, and so we can
use our taˆtonnement procedure to find tolls that induce target flows at equilibrium.
Our results for maximizing profits and optimizing tolls follow from a more general method that allows
the leader in a large class of continuous action Stackelberg game to iteratively and efficiently maximize his
objective function while only observing the follower’s response. The class requires the following conditions:
1. The follower’s utility function is strongly concave in her own actions and linear in the leader’s actions.
2. The leader’s objective function is concave when written as a function of the follower’s actions.1
Finally, we show that our techniques are tolerant to two different kinds of noise. Our techniques work
even if the follower only approximately maximizes his utility function, which corresponds to bounded, but
adversarially chosen noise – and also if unbounded, but well behaved (i.e. zero mean and bounded variance)
noise is introduced into the system. To illustrate this noise tolerance, we show how to solve a simple d-
dimensional principal-agent problem, in which the principal contracts for the production of d types of goods
that are produced as a stochastic function of the agent’s actions.
1.2 Related Work
There is a very large literature in operations research on solving so-called “bilevel programming” problems,
which are closely related to Stackelberg games. Similar to a Stackelberg game, the variables in a bilevel
programming problem are partitioned into two “levels.” The second-level variables are constrained to be the
optimal solution to some problem defined by the first-level variables. See [CMS05] for a survey of the bilevel
programming literature. Unlike our work, this literature does not focus substantially on computational issues
(many of the algorithms are not polynomial time). [KCP10] show that optimally solving certain discrete
Stackelberg games is NP-hard. Even ignoring computational efficiency, this literature assumes knowledge
of the objective function of the “follower.” Our work departs significantly from this literature by assuming
that the leader has no knowledge of the follower’s utility function.
There are two other works that we are aware of that consider solving Stackelberg games when the
follower’s utility function is unknown. Letchford, Conitzer, and Munagala [LCM09] give algorithms for
learning optimal leader strategies with a number of queries that is polynomial in the number of pure strate-
gies of the leader. In our setting, the leader has a continuous and high dimensional action space, and so
the results of [LCM09] do not apply. Blum, Haghtalab, and Procaccia [BHP14] consider the problem of
learning optimal strategies for the leader in a class of security games. They exploit the structure of security
games to learn optimal strategies for the leader in a number of queries that is polynomial in the represen-
tation size of the game (despite the fact that the number of pure strategies is exponential). The algorithm
of [BHP14] is not computationally efficient – indeed, the problem they are solving is NP-hard. Neither of
these techniques apply to our setting – and despite the fact that in our setting the leader has a continuous
1When the leader and follower are instead trying to minimize a cost function, replace “concave” with “convex” in the above.
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action space (which is exponentially large even under discretization), we are able to give an algorithm with
both polynomial query complexity and polynomial running time.
There is also a body of related work related to our main example of profit maximization. Specifically,
there is a recent line of work on learning to predict from revealed preferences ([BV06, ZR12, BDM+14]). In
this line, the goal is to predict buyer behavior, rather than to optimize seller prices. Following these works,
Amin et al. [ACD+15] considered how to find profit maximizing pricing from revealed preferences in the
special case in which the buyer has a linear utility function and a fixed budget. The technique of [ACD+15] is
quite specialized to linear utility functions, and does not easily extend to more general utility functions in the
profit maximization problem, and not to Stackelberg games in general. “Revealed preferences” queries are
quite similar to demand queries (see e.g. [BN09]). Demand queries are known to be sufficient to find welfare
optimal allocations, and more generally, to be able to solve separable convex programs whose objective is
social welfare. In contrast, our optimization problem is non-convex (and so the typical methodology by
which demand queries are used does not apply), and our objective is not welfare.
The profit maximization application can be viewed as a dynamic pricing problem in which the seller
has no knowledge of the buyers utilities. Babaioff et al. [BDKS15] study a version of this problem that
is incomparable to our setting. On the one hand, [BDKS15] allow for distributions over buyers. On the
other hand, [BDKS15] is limited to selling a single type of good, whereas our algorithms apply to selling
bundles of many types of goods. There is also work related to our optimal tolling problem. In an elegant
paper, Bhaskar et al. [BLSS14] study how one can iteratively find tolls such that a particular target flow
is an equilibrium of a non-atomic routing game where the latency functions are unknown, which is a sub-
problem we also need to solve in the routing application. Their technique is specialized to routing games,
and requires that the unknown latency functions have a known simple functional form (linear or low-degree
convex polynomial). In contrast, our technique works quite generally, and in the special case of routing
games, does not require the latency functions to satisfy any known functional form (or even be convex). Our
technique can also be implemented in a noise tolerant way, although at the expense of having a polynomial
dependence on the approximation parameter, rather than a polylogarithmic dependence (in the absence
of noise, our method can also be implemented to depend only polylogarithmically on the approximation
parameter.)
Finally, our work is related in motivation to a recent line of work designed to study the sample complexity
of auctions [BBHM08, CR14, HMR14, DHN14, CHN14, BMM15, MR15]. In this line of work, like in
our work, the goal is to optimize an objective in a game theoretic setting when the designer has no direct
knowledge of participant’s utility functions.
2 Preliminaries
We will denote the set of non-negative real numbers by R+ = {x ∈ R | x ≥ 0} and the set of positive real
numbers by R>0 = {x ∈ R | x > 0}. For a set C ⊆ Rd and a norm ‖ · ‖, we will use ‖C‖ = supx∈C ‖x‖
to denote the diameter of C with respect to the norm ‖ · ‖. When the norm is unspecified, ‖ · ‖ will denote
the Euclidean norm ‖ · ‖2.
An important concept we use is the interior of a set. In the following, we will use Bu to denote the unit
ball centered at u for any u ∈ Rd.
Definition 1. For any δ > 0 and any set C ⊆ Rd, the δ-interior IntC,δ of C is a subset of C such that a
point x is in the δ-interior IntC,δ of C if the ball of radius δ centered at x is contained in C , that is:
x+ δB0 = {x+ δy | ‖y‖ ≤ 1} ⊆ C.
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The interior IntC of C is a subset of C such that a point x is in IntC if there exists some δ′ > 0 such that x
is in IntC,δ′ .
We will also make use of the notions of Ho¨lder continuity and Lipschitzness.
Definition 2. A function f : C → R is (λ, β)-Ho¨lder continuous for some λ, β ≥ 0 if for any x, y ∈ C ,
|f(x)− f(y)| ≤ λ‖x− y‖β .
A function f is λ-Lipschitz if it is (λ, 1)-Ho¨lder continuous.
2.1 Projected Subgradient Descent
A key ingredient in our algorithms is the ability to minimize a convex function (or maximize a concave
function), given access only to the subgradients of the function (i.e. with a so-called “first-order” method).
For concreteness, in this paper we do so using the projected sub gradient descent algorithm. This algorithm
has the property that it is noise-tolerant, which is important in some of our applications. However, we
note that any other noise-tolerant first-order method could be used in place of gradient descent to obtain
qualitatively similar results. In fact, we show in the appendix that for applications that do not require noise
tolerance, we can use the Ellipsoid algorithm, which obtains an exponentially better dependence on the
approximation parameter. Because we strive for generality, in the body of the paper we restrict attention to
gradient descent.
Let C ⊆ Rd be a compact and convex set that is contained in a Euclidean ball of radius R, centered at
some point x1 ∈ Rd. Let c : Rd → R be a convex “loss function.” Assume that c is also λ-Lipschitz—-that
is, |c(x) − c(y)| ≤ λ‖x− y‖2. Let ΠC denote the projection operator onto C,
ΠC(x) = argmin
y∈C
‖x− y‖.
Projected subgradient descent is an iterative algorithm that starts at x1 ∈ C and iterates the following
equations
yt+1 = xt − η gt, where gt ∈ ∂c(xt)
xt+1 = ΠX (yt+1)
The algorithm has the following guarantee.
Theorem 3. The projected subgradient descent algorithm with η = R
λ
√
T
satisfies
c
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
xs
)
≤ min
y∈C
c(y) +
Rλ√
T
Alternatively, the algorithm finds a solution within ε of optimal after T = (Rλ/ε)2 steps.
2.2 Strong Convexity
We will make essential use of strong convexity/concavity of certain functions.
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Definition 4. Let φ : C → R be a function defined over a convex set C ⊆ Rd. We say φ is σ-strongly convex
if for every x, y ∈ C ,
φ(y) ≥ φ(x) + 〈∇φ(x), y − x〉+ σ
2
· ‖y − x‖22.
We say φ is σ-strongly concave if (−φ) is σ-strongly convex.
An extremely useful property of strongly convex functions is that any point in the domain that is close
to the minimum in objective value is also close to the minimum in Euclidean distance.
Lemma 5. Let φ : C → R be a σ-strongly convex function, and let x∗ = argminx∈C φ(x) be the minimizer
of φ. Then, for any x ∈ C ,
‖x− x∗‖22 ≤
2
σ
· (φ(x) − φ(x∗)).
Similarly, if φ is σ-strongly concave, and x∗ = argmaxx∈C φ(x), then for any x ∈ C ,
‖x− x∗‖22 ≤
2
σ
· (φ(x∗)− φ(x)).
2.3 Tools for Zeroth-Order Optimization
We briefly discuss a useful tool for noisy zeroth-order optimization (also known as bandit optimization)
by [BLNR15], which will be used as blackbox algorithm in our framework. The important feature we
require, satisfied by the algorithm from [BLNR15] is that the optimization procedure be able to tolerate a
small amount of adversarial noise.
Definition 6. Let C be a convex set in Rd. We say that C is well-rounded if there exist r,R > 0 such that
Bd2(r) ⊆ C ⊆ Bd2(R) and R/r ≤ O(
√
d), where Bd2(γ) denotes an ℓ2 ball of radius γ in Rd.
Let C be a well-rounded convex set in Rd and F, f : Rd → R be functions such that f is convex and F
satisfies
sup
x∈C
|F (x)− f(x)| ≤ ε/d, (1)
for some ε > 0. The function F can be seen as an oracle that gives a noisy evaluation of f at any point in C .
Belloni et al. [BLNR15] give an algorithm that finds a point x ∈ C that approximately optimizes the convex
function f and only uses function evaluations of F at points in x ∈ C . The set C only needs to be specified
via a membership oracle that decides if a point x is in C or not.
Lemma 7 ([BLNR15], Corollary 1). Let C be a well-rounded set in Rd and f and F be functions that
satisfy Equation (1). There is an algorithm ZOO(ε, C) (short for zeroth-order optimization) that makes
O˜(d4.5) calls2 to F and returns a point x ∈ C such that
E[f(x)] ≤ min
y∈C
f(y) + ε.
Naturally, the algorithm can also be used to approximately maximize a concave function.
2The notation O˜(·) hides the logarithmic dependence on d and 1/ε.
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3 Profit Maximization From Revealed Preferences
3.1 The Model and Problem Setup
Consider the problem of maximizing profit from revealed preferences. In this problem, there is a producer,
who wants to sell a bundle x of d divisible goods to a consumer. The bundles are vectors x ∈ C where
C ⊆ Rd+ is some set of feasible bundles that we assume is known to both the producer and consumer.
• The producer has an unknown cost function c : Rd+ → R+. He is allowed to set prices p ∈ Rd+ for
each good, and receives profit
r(p) = 〈p, x∗(p)〉 − c(x∗(p)),
where x∗(p) is the bundle of goods the consumer purchases at prices p. His goal is to find the profit
maximizing prices
p∗ = argmax
p∈Rd
+
r(p).
• The consumer has a valuation function v : Rd+ → R+. The valuation function is unknown to the
producer. The consumer has a quasi-linear utility function u(x, p) = v(x) − 〈p, x〉. Given prices p,
the consumer will buy the bundle x∗(p) ∈ C that maximizes her utility. Thus,
x∗(p) = argmax
x∈C
u(x, p) = argmax
x∈C
(v(x)− 〈x, p〉) .
We call x∗(p) the induced bundle at prices p.
In our model, in each time period t the producer will choose prices pt and can observe the resulting
induced bundle x∗(pt) and profit r(pt). We would like to design an algorithm so that after a polynomial
number of observations T , the profit r(pT ) is nearly as large as the optimal profit r(p∗).
We will make several assumptions about the functions c and v and the set C . We view these assumptions
as comparatively mild:
Assumption 3.1 (Set of Feasible Bundles). The set of feasible bundles C ⊆ Rd+ is convex and well-rounded.
It also contains the set (0, 1]d ⊆ C (the consumer can simultaneously buy at least one unit of each good).
Also, ‖C‖2 ≤ γ (e.g. when C = (0, 1]d, we have γ =
√
d). Lastly, C is downward closed, in the sense that
for any x ∈ C , there exists some δ ∈ (0, 1) such that δ x ∈ C (the consumer can always choose buy less of
each good).
Assumption 3.2 (Producer’s Cost Function). The producer’s cost function c : Rd+ → R is convex and
Lipschitz-continuous.
Assumption 3.3 (Consumer’s Valuation Function). The consumer’s valuation function v : Rd+ → R is non-
decreasing, Ho¨lder-continuous, differentiable and strongly concave over C . For any price vector p ∈ Rd+,
the induced bundle x∗(p) = argmaxx∈C u(x, p) is defined.
Note that without the assumption that the consumer’s valuation function is concave and that the pro-
ducer’s cost function is convex, even with full information, their corresponding optimization problems
would not be polynomial time solvable. Our fourth assumption of homogeneity is more restrictive , but
as we observe, is satisfied by a wide range of economically meaningful valuation functions including CES
and Cobb-Douglas utilities. Informally, homogeneity is a scale-invariance condition — changing the units
by which quantities of goods are measured should have a predictable multiplicative effect on the buyer
valuation functions:
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Definition 8. For k ≥ 0, a function v : Rd+ → R+ is homogeneous of degree k if for every x ∈ Rd and for
every σ > 0,
v(σx) = σkv(x).
The function v is simply homogeneous if it is homogeneous of degree k for some k ≥ 0.
Our fourth assumption is simply that the buyer valuation function is homogeneous of some degree:
Assumption 3.4. The consumer’s valuation function v is homogeneous.
3.2 An Overview of Our Solution
We present our solution in three main steps:
1. First, we show that the profit function can be expressed as a concave function r(x) of the consumer’s
induced bundle x, rather than as a (non-concave) function of the prices.
2. Next, we show that for a given candidate bundle x, we can iteratively find prices p such that x ≈ x∗(p).
That is, in each time period s we can set prices ps and observe the purchased bundle x∗(ps), and after
a polynomial number of time periods S, we are guaranteed to find prices p = pS such that x∗(p) ≈ x.
Once we have found such prices, we can observe the profit r(x∗(p)) ≈ r(x), which allows us to
simulate query access to r(x).
3. Finally, we use our simulated query access to r(x) as feedback to a bandit concave optimization
algorithm, which iteratively queries bundles x, and quickly converges to the profit maximizing bundle.
3.3 Expressing Profit as a Function of the Bundle
First, we carry out Step 1 above and demonstrate how to rewrite the profit function as a function of the
bundle x, rather than as a function of the prices p. Note that for any given bundle x ∈ C , there might be
multiple price vectors that induce x. We denote the set of price vectors that induce x by:
P ∗(x) = {p ∈ Rd | x∗(p) = x}.
We then define the profit of a bundle x to be
r(x) = max
p∈P ∗(x)
r(p) = max
p∈P ∗(x)
〈p, x〉 − c(x).
Observe that the profit maximizing price vector p ∈ P ∗(x) is the price vector that maximizes revenue
〈p, x〉, since the cost c(x) depends only on x, and so is the same for every p ∈ P ∗(x). The following lemma
characterizes the revenue maximizing price vector that induces any fixed bundle x ∈ C .
Lemma 9. Let x̂ ∈ C be a bundle, and P ∗(x̂) be the set of price vectors that induce bundle x̂. Then the
price vector p = ∇v(x̂) is the revenue maximizing price vector that induces x̂. That is, ∇v(x̂) ∈ P ∗(x̂) and
for any price vector p′ ∈ P ∗(x̂), 〈p′, x̂〉 ≤ 〈∇v(x̂), x̂〉.
Proof. Observe that for any x ∈ C the gradient of the consumer’s utility u(x, p) = v(x) − 〈p, x〉 with
respect to x is (∇v − p). If the prices are p = ∇v(x̂), then since v is concave and ∇v(x̂) − p = 0, x̂ is a
maximizer of the consumer’s utility function. Thus, we have x∗(∇v(x̂)) = x̂, and so ∇v(x̂) ∈ P ∗(x̂).
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Suppose that there exists another price vector p′ ∈ P ∗(x̂) such that p′ 6= ∇v(x̂). Since the function
u(·, p′) is concave in x and x̂ ∈ argmaxx∈C u(x, p′), we know that for any x′ ∈ C〈∇v(x̂)− p′, x′ − x̂〉 ≤ 0,
otherwise there is a feasible ascent direction, which contradicts the assumption that x̂ maximizes u(x, p′).
By 3.1, we know there exists some δ < 1 such that δx̂ ∈ C . Now consider x′ = δx̂, then it follows that〈∇v(x̂)− p′, (1− δ) x̂〉 = (1− δ) (〈∇v(x̂), x̂〉 − 〈p′, x̂〉) ≥ 0.
Therefore, 〈p′, x〉 ≤ 〈∇v(x), x〉, as desired. This completes the proof.
With this characterization of the revenue maximizing price vector, we can then rewrite the profit as a
function of x in closed form for any x ∈ C:
r(x) = 〈∇v(x), x〉 − c(x). (2)
Next, we show that r(x) is a concave function of x whenever the valuation v satisfies 3.3 (concavity
and differentiability) and 3.4 (homogeneity).
Theorem 10. If the consumer’s valuation function v is differentiable, homogeneous, and concave over C ,
the producer’s profit function r(x) = 〈∇v(x), x〉 − c(x) is concave over the domain C .
To prove this result, we invoke Euler’s theorem for homogeneous functions:
Theorem 11 (Euler’s Theorem for Homogeneous Functions). Let v : C → R+ be continuous and differen-
tiable. Then v is homogeneous of degree k if and only if
〈∇v(x), x〉 = k · v(x).
Proof of Theorem 10. Recall that:
r(x) = 〈∇v(x), x〉 − c(x)
By the assumption that v is continuous, differentiable, and homogeneous of some degree k ≥ 0, we have by
Euler’s theorem that
r(x) = kv(x)− c(x)
Because by assumption, v(x) is concave, and c(x) is convex, we conclude that r(x) is concave.
Finally, we note that many important and well studied classes of valuation functions satisfy our assump-
tions – namely differentiability, strong concavity and homogeneity. Two classes of interest include
• Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES). Valuation functions of the form:
v(x) =
(
d∑
i=1
αix
ρ
i
)β
,
where αi > 0 for every i ∈ [d] and ρ, β > 0 such that ρ < 1 and βρ < 1. These functions are known
to be differentiable, Ho¨lder continuous and strongly concave over the set (0,H]d (see Appendix B.1
for a proof). Observe that v(σx) = (∑di=1 αi(σxi)ρ)β = σρβ(∑di=1 αixρi )β = σρβv(x), so these
functions are homogeneous of degree k = ρβ.
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• Cobb-Douglas. These are valuation functions of the form
v(x) =
d∏
i=1
xαii ,
where αi > 0 for every i ∈ [d] and
∑d
i=1 αi < 1. These functions are known to be differentiable,
Ho¨lder continuous and strongly concave over the set (0,H]d (see Appendix B.1 for a proof). Observe
that v(σx) =
∏d
i=1(σxi)
αi = (
∏d
i=1 σ
αi)(
∏d
i=1 x
αi
i ) = σ
∑d
i=1 αi · v(x), so these functions are
homogeneous of degree k =
∑d
i=1 αi.
3.4 Converting Bundles to Prices
Next, we carry out Step 2 and show how to find prices p̂ to induce a given bundle x̂. Specifically, the
producer has a target bundle x̂ ∈ C in mind, and would like to learn a price vector p̂ ∈ Rd+ such that the
induced bundle x∗(p̂) is “close” to x̂. That is,
‖x̂− x∗(p̂)‖2 ≤ ε,
for some ε > 0.
Our solution will actually only allow us to produce a price vector p̂ such that x̂ and x∗(p̂) are “close in
value.” That is
|u(x̂, p̂)− u(x∗(p̂), p̂)| ≤ δ.
However, by strong concavity of the valuation function, this will be enough to guarantee that the actual
bundle is close to the target bundle. The following is just an elaboration of assumption 3.3:
Assumption 3.5 (Quantitative version of 3.3). The valuation function v is both
1. (λval, β)-Ho¨lder continuous over the domain C with respect to the ℓ2 norm—for all x, x′ ∈ C ,
|v(x) − v(x′)| ≤ λval · ‖x− x′‖β2 ,
for some constants λval ≥ 1 and β ∈ (0, 1], and
2. σ-strongly concave over the interior of C—for all x, x′ ∈ C ,
v(x′) ≤ v(x) + 〈∇v(x), x′ − x〉 − (σ/2) · ‖x− x′‖22.
Our algorithm LearnPrice(x̂, ε) is given as Algorithm 1. We will prove:
Theorem 12. Let x̂ ∈ C be a target bundle and ε > 0. Then LearnPrice(x̂, ε) outputs a price vector p̂
such that the induced bundle satisfies ‖x̂− x∗(p̂)‖ ≤ ε and the number of observations it needs is no more
than
T = d · poly
(
1
ε
,
1
σ
, γ, λval
)
.
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Algorithm 1 Learning the price vector to induce a target bundle: LearnPrice(x̂, ε)
Input: A target bundle x̂ ∈ C , and target accuracy ε
Initialize: restricted price space P = {p ∈ Rd+ | ‖p‖ ≤
√
dL} where
L = (λval)
1/β
(
4
ε2σ
)(1−β)/β
p1j = 0 for all good j ∈ [d] T =
32dL2γ2
ε4σ2
η =
√
2γ
L
√
dT
For t = 1, . . . , T :
Observe the purchased bundle by the consumer x∗(pt)
Update price vector with projected subgradient descent:
p̂t+1j = p
t
j − η
(
x̂j − x∗(pt)j
)
for each j ∈ [d], pt+1 = ΠP
[
p̂t+1
]
Output: p̂ = 1/T
∑T
t=1 p
t.
To analyze LearnPrice(x̂, ε), we will start by defining the following convex program whose solution is
the target bundle x̂.
max
x∈C
v(x) (3)
such that xj ≤ x̂j for every good j ∈ [d] (4)
Since v is non-decreasing, it is not hard to see that x̂ is the optimal solution. The partial Lagrangian of
this program is defined as follows,
L(x, p) = v(x) −
d∑
j=1
pj(xj − x̂j),
where pj is the dual variable for each constraint (4) and is interpreted as the price of good j. By strong
duality, we know that there is a value OPT such that
max
x∈C
min
p∈Rd
+
L(x, p) = min
p∈Rd
+
max
x∈C
L(x, p) = OPT = v(x̂). (5)
We know that OPT = v(x̂) because x̂ is the optimal solution to (3)-(4).
We can also define the Lagrange dual function g : Rd → R to be
g(p) = max
x∈C
L(x, p).
We will show that an approximately optimal price vector for g approximately induces the target bundle
x̂, and that LearnPrice(x̂, ε) is using projected subgradient descent to find such a solution to g. In order
to reason about the convergence rate of the algorithm, we restrict the space of the prices to the following
bounded set:
P =
{
p ∈ Rd+ | ‖p‖2 ≤
√
d (λval)
1/β
(
4
ε2σ
)(1−β)/β}
. (6)
First, we can show that the minimax value of the Lagrangian remains closed to OPT even if we restrict
the prices to the set P.
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Lemma 13. There exists a value R-OPT such that
max
x∈C
min
p∈P
L(x, p) = min
p∈P
max
x∈C
L(x, p) = R-OPT.
Moreover, v(x̂) ≤ R-OPT ≤ v(x̂) + ε2σ4 .
Proof. Since C and P are both convex and P is also compact, the minimax theorem [Sio58] shows that
there is a value R-OPT such that
max
x∈C
min
p∈P
L(x, p) = min
p∈P
max
x∈C
L(x, p) = R-OPT. (7)
Since P ⊆ Rd+, by (5), we have R-OPT ≥ v(x̂). Thus, we only need to show that R-OPT ≤ v(x̂) + α,
where α = ε2σ/4. Let (x•, p•) be a pair of minimax strategies for (7). That is
x• ∈ argmax
x∈C
min
p∈P
L(x, p) and p• ∈ argmin
p∈P
max
x∈C
L(x, p)
It suffices to show that L(x•, p•) ≤ v(x̂) + α. Suppose not, then we have
v(x̂) + α < L(x•, p•) = min
p∈P
L(x•, p) = v(x•)−max
p∈P
〈p, x• − x̂〉 ≤ v(x•).
Now consider the bundle y such that yj = max{x•j , x̂j} for each j ∈ [d]. It is clear that v(y) ≥
v(x•) > v(x̂). Let L = (λval)1/β
(
4
ε2σ
)(1−β)/β
, then we can construct the following price vector p′ ∈ P
such that p′j = L for each good j with x•j > x̂j , and p′j = 0 for all other goods. Since we assume that v is
(λval, β)-Ho¨lder continuous with respect to ℓ2 norm, we have
v(x•)− v(x̂) ≤ v(y)− v(x̂) ≤ λval‖y − x̂‖β2 ≤ λval‖y − x̂‖β1
It follows that
v(x̂) + α < L(x•, p•) ≤ L(x•, p′)
= v(x•)− 〈p′, x• − x̂〉
= v(x•)−
∑
j:x•j>x̂j
L (y − x̂j)
= v(x•)− L‖y − x̂‖1 ≤ v(y)− L‖y − x̂‖2
Suppose that ‖y − x̂‖2 ≥ 1 or β = 1, we know that ‖y − x̂‖β2 ≤ ‖y − x̂‖2. This means v(x̂) + α <
v(y)− L‖y − x̂‖β2 ≤ v(y)− λval‖y − x̂‖β2 ≤ v(x̂), a contradiction.
Next suppose that ‖y − x̂‖2 < 1 and β ∈ (0, 1). We also have that
α < v(y)− v(x̂)− L‖y − x̂‖2
≤ λval‖y − x̂‖β2 − L‖y − x̂‖2
≤ λval ‖y − x̂‖β2
(
1− L
λval
‖y − x̂‖1−β2
)
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Since α > 0, it must be that
(
1− Lλval ‖y − x̂‖
1−β
2
)
is also positive, and so ‖y − x̂‖2 <
(
λval
L
)1/(1−β)
. By
the choice of our L,
α < λval
(
λval
L
)β/(1−β)
=
ε2σ
4
= α
which is a contradiction. Therefore, the minimax value of (7) is no more than v(x̂) + α.
The preceding lemma shows that x̂ is a primal optimal solution (even when prices are restricted). There-
fore, if p̂ = argminp∈P g(p) are the prices that minimize the Lagrangian dual, we must have that x̂ = x∗(p̂)
is the induced bundle at prices p̂. The next lemma shows that if p′ are prices that approximately minimize
the Lagrangian dual, then the induced bundle x∗(p′) is close to x̂.
Lemma 14. Let p′ ∈ P be a price vector such that g(p′) ≤ minp∈P g(p) + α. Let x′ = x∗(p′) be the
induced bundle at prices p′. Then x′ satisfies
‖x′ − x̂‖ ≤ 2
√
α/σ.
Proof. Let R-OPT denote the Lagrangian value when we restrict the price space to P. From Lemma 13, we
have that R-OPT = minp∈P g(p) ∈ [v(x̂), v(x̂) + α]. By assumption, we also have
g(p′) = L(x′, p′) ≤ R-OPT + α ≤ v(x̂) + 2α.
Note that L(x̂, p′) = v(x̂)− 〈p′, x̂− x̂〉 = v(x̂) and x′ is the maximizer for L(·, p′), so it follows that
0 ≤ L(x′, p′)− L(x̂, p′) ≤ 2α.
Since we know that v is a σ-strongly concave function over C , the utility function u(·, p′) = v(·)− 〈p′, ·〉 is
also σ-strongly concave over C .3 Then we have the following by Lemma 5 and the above argument,
2α ≥ L(x′, p′)− L(x̂, p′) = u(x′, p′)− u(x̂, p′) ≥ σ
2
‖x′ − x‖2 (8)
This means ‖x′ − x‖ ≤ 2√α/σ.
Based on Lemma 14, we can reduce the problem of finding the appropriate prices to induce the target
bundle to finding the approximate optimal solution to argminp∈P g(p). Even though the function g is
unknown to the producer (because v is unknown), we can still approximately optimize the function using
projected subgradient descent if we are provided access to subgradients of g. The next lemma shows that
the bundle x∗(p) purchased by the consumer gives a subgradient of the Lagrange dual objective function at
p.
Lemma 15. Let p be any price vector, and x∗(p) be the induced bundle. Then
(x̂− x∗(p)) ∈ ∂g(p).
3If f(·) is a σ-strongly concave function over C and g(·) is a concave function over C, then (f + g)(·) is a σ-strongly concave
function over C.
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Proof. Given x′ = argmaxx∈[0,1]d L(x, p), we know by the envelope theorem that a subgradient of g can
be obtained as follows
∂g
∂pj
= x̂j − x′j for each j ∈ [d].
Note that x′ corresponds to the induced bundle of p because
x′ = argmax
x∈C
L(x, p)
= argmax
x∈C
[v(x)− 〈p, x− x̂〉]
= argmax
x∈C
[v(x)− 〈p, x〉]
= argmax
x∈C
u(x, p) = x∗(p)
Therefore, the vector (x̂− x∗(p)) is a subgradient of g at the price vector p.
Now that we know the subgradients of the function g at p can be easily obtained from the induced bundle
purchased by the consumer, it remains to observe that Algorithm LearnPrice(x̂, ε) is performing projected
gradient descent on the Lagrange dual objective, and to analyze its convergence.
Proof of Theorem 12. By Lemma 14, it suffices to show that the price vector p̂ returned by projected gradient
descent satisfies
g(p̂) ≤ min
p∈P
g(p) +
ε2σ
4
.
Note that the set P is contained in the ℓ2 ball centered at 0 with radius L. Also, for each pt, the subgradient
we obtain is bounded: ‖x̂− x∗(pt)‖ ≤√‖x̂‖2 + ‖x∗(pt)‖2 ≤ √2γ since ‖C‖ ≤ γ. Since we set
T =
32dL2γ2
ε4σ2
η =
√
2γ
L
√
dT
we can apply the guarantee of projected gradient descent from Theorem 3, which gives:
g(p̂)−min
p∈P
g(p) ≤
√
2Lγ√
T
=
ε2σ
4
By Lemma 14, we know that the resulting bundle x∗(p̂) satisfies that ‖x̂− x∗(p)‖ ≤ ε.
Remark 16. Since noise tolerance is not required in this setting, it is possible approximately induce the
target bundle only using poly-logarithmically in (1/ε) number of observations. We will give an ellipsoid-
based variant of LearnPrice in Appendix D that achieves this guarantee.
3.5 Profit Maximization
Finally, we will show how to combine the algorithm LearnPrice with the zeroth order optimization algo-
rithm ZOO to find the approximate profit-maximizing price vector. At a high level, we will use ZOO to
(approximately) optimize the profit function r over the bundle space and use LearnPrice to (approximately)
induce the optimal bundle.
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Before we show how to use ZOO, we will verify that if we run the algorithm LearnPrice to obtain
prices p̂ that approximately induce the desired bundle x, and observe the revenue generated from prices p̂,
we will indeed obtain an approximation to the revenue function r(x).
Recall from Lemma 9 that the profit function can be written as a function of the bundle
r(x) = 〈∇v(x), x〉 − c(x)
as long as the producer uses the profit maximizing price vector ∇v(x) to induce the bundle x. However,
the price vector returned by LearnPrice might not be the optimal price vector for the induced bundle. In
order to have an estimate of the optimal profit for each bundle, we need to guarantee that prices returned
by LearnPrice are the profit maximizing ones. To do that, we will restrict the bundle space that ZOO is
optimizing over to be the interior of C . Now we show that for every bundle in the interior of C , there is a
unique price vector that induces that bundle. Thus, these prices are the profit-maximizing prices inducing
that bundle.
Lemma 17. Let x′ be a bundle in IntC . Then ∇v(x′) is the unique price vector that induces x′.
Proof. Let p′ be a price vector such that x∗(p′) = x. Since IntC ⊆ C , we must have
x′ = argmax
x∈IntC
[
v(x)− 〈p′, x〉] .
By the definition of IntC , we know that there exists some δ > 0 such that the ball δBx′ is contained in C .
Now consider the function f : Rd → R such that f(x) = u(x, p′). It follows that x′ is a local optimum
of f neighborhood δBx′ . Since f is continuously differentiable, we must have ∇f(x′) = 0 by first-order
conditions. Therefore, we must have
∇f(x′) = ∇v(x′)− p′ = 0,
which implies that p′ = ∇v(x′).
Instead of using the interior itself, we will use a simple and efficiently computable proxy for the interior
obtained by slightly shifting and contracting C .
Claim 18. For any 0 < δ < 1/2, let the set
Cδ = (1− 2δ)C + δ1,
where 1 denotes the d-dimensional vector with 1 in each coordinate. Given 3.1, Cδ is contained in the
(δ/2)-interior of C . That is, Cδ ⊆ IntC,δ/2.
Proof. Our goal is to show that Cδ + δB0 ⊆ C , where B0 denote the unit ball centered at 0. Any point in
Cδ+(δ/2)B0 can be written as x′+(δ/2) y′ for x′ ∈ Cδ and y′ ∈ B0. We will show that x′+(δ/2) y′ ∈ C .
Since x′ ∈ Cδ, there exists x ∈ C such that
x′ = (1− 2δ)x+ δ1.
Since y′ ∈ B0, there exists y ∈ (0, 1]d such that
1
2
y′ = 2y − 1.
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To see this, note that (0, 1]d contains a ball of radius 1/4 whose center is (1/2) · 1. By Assumption 3.1, C
contains (0, 1]d, so y ∈ C . Therefore for some x, y ∈ C ,
x′ + (δ/2) y′ = (1− 2δ)x + δ1+ 2δy − δ1
= (1− 2δ)x + 2δy︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈C
,
where we used convexity of C . Hence, x′ + (δ/2) y′ ∈ C , as desired.
We will let ZOO operate on the set Cδ instead of C , and we first want to show that there is little loss
in profit if we restrict the induced bundle to Cδ. The following is just a formal, quantitative version of of
Assumption 3.2:
Assumption 3.6 (Quantitative version of Assumption 3.2). The producer’s cost function c : Rd+ → R is
λcost-Lipschitz over the domain C with respect to the ℓ2 norm: for x, x′ ∈ C ,
|c(x) − c(x′)| ≤ λcost‖x− x′‖.
Given this assumption, the profit function is also Ho¨lder continuous.
Lemma 19. For any x, y ∈ C such that ‖x− y‖ ≤ 1, the following holds
|r(x)− r(y)| ≤ (λval + λcost)‖x− y‖β .
Proof. Recall the revenue component of the profit function is 〈∇v(x), x〉. Since v is a concave and homo-
geneous function, we know that the homogeneity degree satisfies k ≤ 1. (See Appendix B for a proof). By
Euler’s theorem (Theorem 11),
〈∇v(x), x〉 = k · v(x). (9)
Since v is (λval, β)-Ho¨lder continuous C , by Equation 9 we know that the revenue 〈∇v(x), x〉 is also λval-
Ho¨lder continuous over C . Furthermore, since the cost function c is λcost-Lipschitz over C , the profit
function satisfies the following: for any x, y ∈ C such that ‖x− y‖ ≤ 1, we have
|r(x)− r(y)| ≤ |〈∇v(x), x〉 − 〈∇v(y), y〉| + |c(x) − c(y)| ≤ λval‖x− y‖β + λcost‖x− y‖
Since ‖x− y‖ ≤ 1, we know that ‖x− y‖β ≥ ‖x− y‖, so |r(x)− r(y)| ≤ (λval + λcost)‖x− y‖β .
We can bound the difference between the optimal profits in Cδ and C .
Lemma 20. For any 0 < δ ≤ 1/3γ,
max
x∈C
r(x)−max
x∈Cδ
r(x) ≤ (3δγ)β(λval + λcost).
Proof. Let x∗ ∈ argmaxx∈C r(x). We know that (1− 2δ)x∗ + δ1 ∈ Cδ, and
‖x∗ − (1− 2δ)x∗ − δ1‖ ≤ δ‖2x∗ − 1‖ ≤ 3δγ.
By Lemma 19, we then have
r(x∗)− r((1− δ)x∗ + δ1) ≤ (3δγ)β(λval + λcost).
Furthermore, we also know maxx∈Cδ r(x) ≥ r((1− δ)x∗ + δ1), so we have shown the bound above.
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Now we focus on how to optimize the profit function r over the set Cδ. Recall the algorithm ZOO
requires approximate evaluations for the profit function r. Such evaluations can be implemented using our
algorithm LearnPrice: for each bundle x ∈ Cδ, run LearnPrice(x, ε) to obtain a price vector p such that
‖x− x∗(p)‖ ≤ ε, and then the resulting profit r(x∗(p)) serves as an approximate evaluation for r(x):
|r(x)− r(x∗(p))| ≤ (λval + λcost)εβ .
Algorithm 2 Learning the price vector to optimize profit: Opro(C,α)
Input: Feasible bundle space C , and target accuracy α
Initialize:
ε = min
{(
α
λ(d+ 1 + (12γ)β)
)1/β
,
1
12γ
}
δ = 4ε α′ = dεβ(λval + λcost)
restricted bundle space Cδ = (1− 2δ)C + δ1 and number of iterations T = O˜(d4.5)
For t = 1, . . . , T :
ZOO(α′, Cδ) queries the profit for bundle xt
Let pt = LearnPrice(xt, ε) and observe the induced bundle x∗(pt)
Send r(x∗(pt)) to ZOO(α′, Cδ) as an approximate evaluation of r(xt)
x̂ = ZOO(α′, Cδ)
p̂ = LearnPrice(x̂, ε)
Output: the last price vector p̂
Theorem 21. Let α > 0 be the target accuracy. The instantiation Opro(C,α) computes a price vector p̂
such that the expected profit
E [r(p̂)] ≥ max
p∈Rd+
r(p)− α,
the number of times it calls the algorithm LearnPrice is bounded by O˜(d4.5), and the total observations it
requires from the consumer is poly(d, 1/α). 4
Proof. First we show that each induced bundle x∗(pt) is in the interior IntC . Note that in the algorithm, we
have ε = δ/4. By the guarantee of LearnPrice in Theorem 12, we have that
‖xt − x∗(pt)‖ ≤ ε = δ/4.
By 18, we know that xt ∈ IntC,δ/2, so the ball of radius ε centered at xt is contained in C , and hence x∗(pt)
is in the interior of C . By Lemma 17 and Lemma 9, each vector pt = ∇v(x∗(pt)) is the profit-maximizing
prices for the induced bundle x∗(pt), so the profit the algorithm observes is indeed r(x∗(pt)).
Next, to establish the accuracy guarantee, we need to bound two sources of error. First, we need to
bound the error from ZOO. To simplify notation, let λ = (λval + λcost). Recall from Lemma 19 that the
approximate profit evaluation r(x∗(pt)) satisfies
|r(xt)− r(x∗(pt))| ≤ λεβ .
4 In Appendix D, we give a variant of the algorithm with query complexity scaling poly-logarithmically in 1/α.
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By the accuracy guarantee in Lemma 7, the final queried bundle x̂ satisfies
E[r(x̂)] ≥ max
x∈Cδ
r(x)− dλεβ .
Since we know that |r(x̂)− r(x∗(p̂))| ≤ λε, we also have
E[r(x∗(p̂))] ≥ max
x∈Cδ
r(x)− (d+ 1)λεβ .
Next, as we are restricting the bundle space to Cδ, there might be further loss of profit. Note that δ = 4ε ≤
1/3γ, so we can bound it with Lemma 20:
E[r (x∗(p̂))] ≥ max
x∈C
r(x)− λ
[
(d+ 1)εβ + (3δγ)β
]
= max
x∈C
r(x)− λ
[
(d+ 1)εβ + (12εγ)β
]
.
If we plug in our setting for parameter ε, we recover the desired bound since r(x∗(p̂)) = r(p̂) and
maxx∈C r(x) = maxp∈Rd
+
r(p).
Finally, we need to bound the total number of observations the algorithm needs from the consumer. In
each iteration, the instantiation LearnPrice(xt, ε) requires number of observations bounded by according
to Theorem 12
T ′ = d · poly
(
1
ε
,
1
σ
, γ, λval
)
Therefore, after plugging in ε, we have that the total number of observations Opro needs is bounded by
O(T ′ × T ) = poly(d, 1/α)
(hiding constants λcost, λval, σ, γ).
4 General Framework of Stackelberg Games
Now that we have worked out a concrete application of our method in the context of learning to maximize
revenue from revealed preferences, we will abstract our techniques and show how they can be used to solve a
general family of Stackelberg games in which the objective of the follower is unknown to the leader. Along
the way, we will also generalize our technique to operate in a setting in which the follower responds to
the leaders actions by only approximately maximizing her utility function. In addition to generalizing the
settings in which our approach applies, this avoids a technical concern that might otherwise arise – that
bundles maximizing strongly concave utility functions might be non-rational. In addition to being able to
handle approximations to optimal bundles that would be induced by taking a rational approximation, we
show our method is robust to much larger errors.
In our general framework, we consider a Stackelberg game that consists of a leader with action set AL
and a follower with action set AF . Each player has a utility function UL, UF : AL × AF → R. In the
corresponding Stackelberg game, the leader chooses an action p ∈ AL, and then the follower chooses a
ζ-best response x′(p) such that
UF (p, x
′(p)) ≥ UF (p, x∗(p))− ζ,
where x∗(p) = argmaxx∈AF UF (p, x) is the follower’s exact best-response. Note that when ζ = 0, x
′(p) =
x∗(p).
The example of maximizing revenue from revealed preferences is a special case of this framework. The
producer is the leader and his action space consists of prices p and the follower is the consumer and her
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action space is the bundle x she purchases. The producer’s utility for a pair (p, x) is his revenue minus the
cost of producing x and the consumer’s utility is her value for x minus the price she pays.
In general, we consider solving the leader’s optimization problem—find p ∈ AL such that UL(p, x∗(p))
is (approximately) maximized. Formally, we consider a sub-class of Stackelberg games that have the fol-
lowing structure.
Definition 22. An instance is a Stackelberg game S(AL,AF , φ) which consists of two players—the leader
and the follower such that:
• the leader has action set AL ⊆ Rd, the follower has action set AF ⊆ Rd, both of which are convex
and compact;
• the follower’s utility function UF : AL ×AF → R takes the form
UF (p, x) = φ(x)− 〈p, x〉,
where φ : Rd → R is a strongly concave, differentiable function unknown to the leader;
• the leader’s utility function UL : AL ×AF → R is an unknown function.
The optimization problem associated with the game instance is maxp∈AL ψ(p, x∗(p)).
Our first step to solve the problem is to rewrite the leader’s utility function so that it can be expressed as
a function only in the follower’s action. For each action of the follower x ∈ AF , the set of leader’s actions
that induce x is
P ∗(x) = {p ∈ AL | x∗(p) = x}.
Among all of the leader’s actions that induce x, the optimal one is:
p∗(x) = argmax
p∈P ∗(x)
UL(p, x),
where ties are broken arbitrarily. We can then rewrite the leader’s objective as a function of only x:
ψ(x) = UL(p
∗(x), x). (10)
Note that to approximately solve the leader’s optimization problem, it is sufficient to find the follower’s
action x̂ ∈ AF which approximately optimizes ψF (·), together with the action p̂ ∈ AL that approximately
induces x̂. Before we present the algorithm, we state the assumptions on the utility functions of the two
players that we will need.
Assumption 4.1. The game S(AL,AF , φ) satisfies the following properties.
1. The function ψ : AL → R defined in (10) is concave and λL-Lipschitz;
2. The function φ : AF → R is non-decreasing, σ-strongly concave and λF -Lipschitz;
3. The action space of the leader AL contains the following set
P = {p ∈ Rd+ | ‖p‖ ≤
√
dλF }; (11)
4. The action space of the follower AF has bounded diameter, ‖AF ‖ ≤ γ.
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4.1 Inducing a Target Action of the Follower
We first consider the following sub-problem. Given a target action x̂ of the follower we want to learn an
action p̂ for the leader such that the induced action satisfies
‖x′(p̂)− x̂‖ ≤ ε.
We now give an algorithm to learn p̂ that requires only polynomially many observations of the follower’s
ζ-approximate best responses.
Algorithm 3 Learning the leader’s action to induce a target follower’s action: LearnLead(x̂, ε)
Input: A target follower action x̂ ∈ AF , and target accuracy ε
Initialize: restricted action space P = {p ∈ Rd+ | ‖p‖ ≤
√
dλF}
p1j = 0 for all j ∈ [d] T =
(
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√
2dλFγ
ε2σ − 4ζ
)2
η =
√
2γ√
dλF
√
T
For t = 1, . . . , T :
Observe the induced action by the follower x∗(pt)
Update leader’s action:
p˜t+1j = p
t
j − η
(
x̂j − x∗(pt)j
)
for each j ∈ [d], pt+1 = ΠP
[
p̂t+1
]
Output: p̂ = 1/T
∑T
t=1 p
t.
Theorem 23. Let x̂ ∈ AF be a target follower action and ε > 0. Then LearnLead(x̂, ε) outputs a leader
action p̂ such that the induced follower action satisfies ‖x̂ − x′(p̂)‖ ≤ ε and the number of observations it
needs is no more than
T = O
(
dλ2F γ
2
ε4σ2
)
as long as ε > 2
√
2ζ/σ.
4.2 Optimizing Leader’s Utility
Now that we know how to approximately induce any action of the follower using LearnLead, we are ready
to give an algorithm to optimize the leader’s utility function UL. Recall that we can write the UL as a
function ψ that depends only of the follower’s action. In order to obtain the approximately optimal utility
ψ(x), the leader must play the optimal action p that induces the follower to play approximately x.
Assumption 4.2. For any x̂ ∈ AF and ε > 0, the instantiation LearnLead(x̂, ε) returns p̂ such that
p̂ = p∗ (x∗(p̂)) .
Whenever this assumption holds, we can use LearnLead to allow the leader to obtain utility UL(p̂, x∗(p̂)) =
ψ(x∗(p̂)).
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While 4.2 appears to be quite strong, we can often achieve it. Recall that we were able to satisfy 4.2
in our revealed preferences application by operating in the interior of the feasible region of the follower’s
action space, and we can similarly do this in our principal-agent example. Moreover, it is trivially satisfied
whenever the leader’s objective function depends only on the follower’s action, since in this case, every
leader-action p which induces a particular follower-action x is optimal. This is the case, for example, in our
routing games application in Section 5.
Now we will show how to use the algorithm ZOO to find an approximate optimal point for the function
ψ. First, we will use LearnLead to provide approximate function evaluation for ψ at each x̂ ∈ AF : our
algorithm first runs LearnLead(x̂, ε) to learn a price vector p̂, and we will use the observed function value on
the induced follower’s approximate best response ψ(x′(p̂)) as an approximation for ψ(x̂). Since LearnLead
guarantees that ‖x′(p̂)− x̂‖ ≤ ε, by the Lipschitz property of ψ we have
|ψ(x̂)− ψ(x′(p̂))| ≤ λLε.
With these approximate evaluations, ZOO can then find a (dλLε)-approximate optimizer of ψ with only
O˜(d4.5) iterations by Lemma 7. The full algorithm is presented in Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4 Leader learn to optimize: LearnOpt(AF , α)
Input: Follower action space C , and target accuracy α
Initialize: number of iterations T = O˜(n4.5) and ε = αλL(d+1)
For t = 1, . . . , T :
ZOO(dελL,AF ) queries the objective value for action xt ∈ AF
Let pt = LearnLead(xt, ε) and observe the induced action x′(pt)
Send ψ(x′(pt)) to ZOO(dελL, Cδ) as an approximate evaluation of ψ(xt)
x̂ = ZOO(dελL,AF )
p̂ = LearnLead(x̂, ε)
Output: the leader action p̂
Theorem 24. Let α > 0 be the target accuracy. The instantiation LearnOpt(AF , α) computes a leader
action p̂ along with its induced follower action x∗(p̂) that satisfies
E[UL(p̂, x
∗(p̂))] ≥ max
p∈AL
UL(p, x
∗(p))− α,
and the number of observations the algorithm requires of the follower is bounded by
O˜
(
d9.5
α4
)
,
as long as α ≥ Ω(dλL
√
ζ/σ).
5 Optimal Traffic Routing from Revealed Behavior
In this section, we give the second main application of our technique discussed in the introduction: how to
find tolls to induce an approximately optimal flow in a non-atomic traffic routing game when the latency
functions are unknown.
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A nonatomic routing game G(G, ℓ,D) is defined by a graph G = (V,E), latency function ℓe on each
edge e ∈ E, and the source, destination and demands for n commodities: D = {(si, ti, ki)}i∈[n]. The
latency function ℓe : R+ → [0, 1] represents the delay on each edge e as a function of the total flow on that
edge. For simplicity, we assume
∑n
i=1 ki = 1, and we let m denote the number of edges |E|.
For each commodity i, the demand ki specifies the volume of flow from si to ti routed by (self-interested)
agents. The game is nonatomic: infinitely many agents each control only an infinitesimal amount of flow
and each agent of type i selects an action (an si-ti path) so as to minimize her total latency. The aggregate
decisions of the agents induce a multicommodity flow (f i)i∈[n], with each vector f i = (f ie)e∈E ∈ Fi, where
Fi is the flow polytope for the i’th commodity:
Fi =
f i ∈ Rm+ | ∑
(v,w)∈E
f ivw =
∑
(u,v)∈E
f iuv,∀v ∈ V \ {si, ti},
∑
(si,w)∈E
f isiw −
∑
(u,si)∈E
f iu,si = ki

Let F = {f = ∑ni=1 f i | f i ∈ Fi for each i} denote the set of feasible flows. A flow f defines a latency
ℓe(fe) on each edge e. Given a path P , we write ℓP (f) =
∑
e∈P ℓe(fe) to denote the sum latency on all
edges in the path. A Nash or Wardrop equilibrium is defined as follows:
Definition 25 (Wardrop equilibrium). A multicommodity flow f̂ is a Wardrop equilibrium of a routing game
if it is feasible and for every commodity i, and for all si-ti paths P,Q with f̂ iP > 0, we have ℓP (f̂) ≤ ℓQ(f̂).
Crucial to our application is the following well known lemma, which states that a Wardrop equilibrium
can be found as the solution to a optimization problem (convex whenever the latencies are non-decreasing),
which minimizes a potential function associated with the routing game
Lemma 26 ([MS96]). A Wardrop equilibrium can be computed by solving the following optimization prob-
lem:
min
f∈F
Φ(f) :=
∑
e
∫ fe
0
ℓe(x) dx
Whenever the latency functions ℓe are each non-decreasing, this is a convex program. We call Φ the potential
function of the routing game.
Now suppose there is a municipal authority which administers the network and wishes to minimize the
social cost of the equilibrium flow:
Ψ(f) =
∑
e∈E
fe · ℓe(fe).
The authority has the power to impose constant tolls on the edges. A toll vector τ = (τe)e∈E ∈ Rm+ induces
a new latency function on each edge: ℓτe(fe) = ℓ(fe) + τe, which gives rise to a different routing game
G(G, ℓτ ,D) with a new potential function Φτ . In particular, the equilibrium flow f∗(τ) induced by the toll
vector is the Wardrop equilibrium of the tolled routing game:
f∗(τ) = argmin
f∈F
Φτ (f) = argmin
f∈F
[∑
e∈E
∫ fe
0
(ℓe(x) + τe)dx
]
= argmin
f∈F
[
Φ(f) +
∑
e∈E
τe · fe
]
.
While the latency functions are unknown to the authority, his goal is to find a toll vector τ̂ such that the
induced flow f∗(τ̂ ) approximately minimizes the total congestion function Ψ.
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We can formulate this problem as an instance of the type of Stackelberg game we defined in Defini-
tion 22, where the authority is the leader, and there is a single “flow” player minimizing the game’s potential
function, serving the role of the follower. We will refer to them as the toll player and the flow player
respectively. In our setting:
1. The toll player has action set τ ∈ Rm+ and the flow player has action set F ;
2. The flow player has a utility function UF : Rm+ ×F → R of the form
UF (τ, f) = −Φ(f)− 〈τ, f〉;
3. The toll player has a utility function UL : Rm+ ×F → R of the form
UL(τ, f) = −Ψ(f).
Now we will apply the tools in Section 4 to solve this problem. Before we begin, we will impose the
following assumptions on the latency functions to match with 4.1. We need two types of assumptions: one
set to let us find tolls to induce a target flow, and another to guarantee that once we can induce such flows
(and hence implement a “flow cost oracle”), we can optimize over flows.
To find tolls to induce a target flow, we require that the potential function Φ be strongly convex in the
flow variables. The following conditions are sufficient to guarantee this:
Assumption 5.1. For each edge e ∈ E, ℓe is differentiable and has derivative bounded away from zero:
there exists some σ > 0 such that for all x ∈ [0, 1], ℓ′e(x) ≥ σ.
Recall that the potential function Φ(x) is a function on m variables (fe)e∈E , and it’s Hessian ∇2Φ at
each f ∈ F is a diagonal matrix with entries ℓ′e(fe) ≥ σ. Therefore, we know that ∇2Φ(f)  σI for
any f ∈ F , and so under Assumption 5.1, Φ is a σ-strongly convex function over F . Note that the only
condition we really require is that the potential function be strongly convex, and there are weaker conditions
that imply this, but we state Assumption 5.1 because of its simplicity.
Once we can implement a flow oracle, we need to be able to use a bandit convex optimization algorithm
to optimize social cost over flows. Hence, we require that the social cost function be convex and Lipschitz.
The following assumptions are sufficient to guarantee this:
Assumption 5.2. For each edge e ∈ E, ℓe is convex and (λ/m)-Lipschitz continuous over [0, 1].
Note that this guarantees that Ψ is λ-Lipschitz over F .
We first show that we can use the algorithm LearnLead to learn a toll vector to induce any flow as a
Wardrop equilibrium.
Lemma 27. Fix any non-atomic routing game satisfying Assumption 5.1. Let f̂ ∈ F in a target flow and
ε > 0. Then the instantiation LearnLead(f̂ , ε) outputs a toll vector τ̂ such that the induced Wardrop
equilibrium flow f∗(τ̂) satisfies ‖f̂ − f∗(τ̂ )‖ ≤ ε, and the number of observations on the flow behavior it
needs is no more than
O
(
m3
ε4σ2
)
.
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Proof. Before we apply Theorem 23, we still need to show that the potential function Φ of the original
routing game (without tolls) is Lipschitz over F . Note that this does not require any assumptions on the
latency functions ℓe other than that they are bounded in [0, 1]. Let f, g ∈ F , then we can write
|Φ(f)−Φ(g)| =
∣∣∣∣∣∑
e
(∫ fe
0
ℓe(x) dx−
∫ ge
0
ℓe(x) dx
)∣∣∣∣∣
=
∣∣∣∣∣∑
e∈E
∫ fe
ge
ℓe(x) dx
∣∣∣∣∣
≤
∑
e∈E
max{ℓe(fe), ℓe(ge)} |fe − ge|
≤
∑
e
|fe − ge| ≤
√
m‖f − g‖,
where the last inequality follows from the fact that ‖x‖1 ≤
√
m‖x‖2 for any x ∈ Rm. Also, observe that
each flow vector in F has norm bounded by √m. Therefore, we know that Φ is a √m-Lipschitz function.
Then we can instantiate Theorem 23 and obtain the result above.
Now we can instantiate Theorem 24 and show that LearnOpt can find a toll vector that induces the
approximately optimal flow.
Pre-processing Step The set F is not a well-rounded convex body in Rm (it has zero volume), so we will
have to apply the following standard pre-processing step to transform it into a well-rounded body. First,
we find a maximal set I of linearly independent points in F . We will then embed the polytope F into this
lower-dimensional subspace spanned by I , so that F becomes full-dimensional. In this subspace, F is a
convex body with a relative interior. Next, we apply the transformation of [LV06] to transform F into a
well-rounded body within Span(I).5 We will run ZOO over the transformed body.
Lemma 28. Let α > 0 be the target accuracy. The instantiation LearnOpt(AF , α) computes a toll vector
τ̂ such that the induced flow f̂ = f∗(τ̂) is α-approximately optimal in expectation:
E
[
Ψ
(
f̂
)]
≤ min
f∈F
Ψ(f) + α.
The total number of observations we need on the flow behavior is bounded by
O˜
(
m11.5
α4
)
.
Remark 29. Just as with the profit maximization example, if we do not require noise tolerance, then we can
improve the dependence on the approximation parameter α to be polylogarithmic. We show how to do this
in the appendix.
5See Section 5 of [LV06] for details of the rounding algorithm.
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6 The Principal-Agent Problem
Our general framework applies even when the leader observes only the noisy feedback that arises when the
follower only approximately maximizes her utility function. This corresponds to adversarially chosen noise
of bounded magnitude. In this section, we show how to handle the natural setting in which the noise being
added need not be bounded, but is well behaved – specifically has mean 0, and bounded variance. This can
be used to model actual noise in an interaction, rather than a failure to exactly maximize a utility function.
As a running example as we work out the details, we will discuss a simple principal-agent problem related
to our profit-maximization example.
In a principal-agent problem, the principal (the leader) defines a contract by which the agent (the fol-
lower) will be paid, as a function of work produced by the agent. The key property of principal agent
problems is that the agent is not able to deterministically produce work of a given quality. Instead, the agent
chooses (and experiences cost as a function of) a level of effort, which stochastically maps to the quality of
his work. However, the effort chosen by the agent is unobservable to the principal – only the quality of the
finished product.
We consider a simple d-dimensional principal-agent problem, in which the result of the agent can be
evaluated along d dimensions, each of which might require a different amount of effort. Since the agent
knows how effort is stochastically mapped to realizations, we abstract away the agent’s choice of an “effort”
vector, and instead (without loss of generality) view the agent as choosing a “target contribution” x ∈ C ⊆
R
d
+ – the expected value of the agent’s ultimate contribution. The agent experiences some strongly convex
cost c(x) for producing a target contribution of x, but might nevertheless be incentivized to produce high
quality contributions by the contract offered by the principal. However, the contribution that is actually
realized (and that the principal observes) is a stochastically perturbed version of x: x˜ = x + θ, where
θ ∈ Rd is a noise vector sampled from the mean-zero Gaussian distribution N (0, I).
The principal wants to optimize over the set of linear contracts: he will choose a price vector p ∈ Rd+,
such that in response to the agent’s realized contribution x˜, the agent collects reward 〈p, x˜〉. His goal is to
choose a price vector to optimize his expected value for the agent’s contribution, minus his own costs.
The agent’s strongly convex cost function c : C → R+ is unknown to the principal. If the principal’s
contract vector is p and the agent attempts to contribute x, then his utility is
Ua(p, x) = 〈p, (x+ θ)〉 − c(x),
and his expected utility is just ua(p, x) = E[Ua(p, x)] = 〈p, x〉 − c(x). Fixing any price p, the agent will
attempt to play the induced contribution vector: x∗(p) = argmaxx∈C (〈p, x〉 − c(x)) in order to optimize
his expected utility.
The principal has value vi for each unit of contribution in the i-th dimension, and upon observing the
realized contribution x˜, his utility is
up(p, x˜) = 〈v, x˜〉 − 〈p, x˜〉 = 〈v − p, x˜〉.
The principal’s goal is to find a price vector p̂ to (approximately) maximize his expected utility:
E[up(p, x
∗(p) + θ)] = E [〈v − p, x∗(p) + θ〉] = 〈v − p, x∗(p)〉.
This is an instantiation of our class of Stackelberg games in which the principal is the leader with action
set Rd+ and utility function ψ(p, x) = 〈v − p, x〉, and the agent is the follower with action set C and
utility function φ(p, x) = 〈p, x〉 − c(x). Indeed, in expectation, it is merely a “procurement” version of
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our profit-maximization example. However, the crucial difference in this application (causing it to deviate
from the general setting defined in Definition 22) is that the leader only gets to observe a noisy version
of the follower’s best response at each round: x˜ = x∗(p) + θ. We will adapt the analysis from Section 3
and Section 4 to show that our algorithm is robust to noisy observations. We make the following assumptions,
which correspond to the set of assumptions we made in our previous applications.
Assumption 6.1. The following assumptions parallel 4.1 and 3.1.
1. The set of feasible contributions C ⊆ Rd+ is convex, closed, and bounded. It also contains the unit
hypercube, [0, 1]d ⊆ C (the agent can simultaneously attempt to contribute at least one unit in each
dimension) and in particular contains 0 ∈ Rd (the agent can contribute nothing). Lastly, ‖C‖2 ≤ γ;
2. the agent’s cost function c is homogeneous, 1-Lipschitz and σ-strongly convex;
3. the principal’s valuation vector has norm ‖v‖ ≤ 1.
6.1 Inducing the Agent’s Contribution Using Noisy Observations
We will first show that in general, LearnLead can learn the leader’s action which approximately induces
any target follower action x̂ even if the algorithm only observes noisy perturbed best responses from the
follower. This result holds in full generality, but we illustrate it by using the principal-agent problem.
First, given any target contribution x̂, consider the following convex program similar to Section 3.4:
min
x∈C
c(x) (12)
such that xj ≥ x̂j for every j ∈ [d] (13)
The Lagrangian of the program is
L(x, p) = c(x) + 〈p, x− x̂〉,
and the Lagrangian dual objective function is
g(p) = min
x∈C
L(x, p).
By the same analysis used in the proof of Lemma 14, if we find a price vector p̂ ∈ P such that g(p̂) ≥
maxp∈P g(p)−α, then we know that the induced contribution vector x∗(p̂) satisfies ‖x∗(p̂)− x̂‖ ≤
√
2α/σ.
Now we show how to (approximately) optimize the function g based on the realized contributions of the
agent, which correspond to mean-zero perturbations of the agent’s best response.
As shown in Lemma 15, a subgradient of g at price p is (x∗(p) − x̂), but now since the principal only
observes the realized contribution vector x˜, our algorithm does not have access to subgradients. However, we
can still obtain an unbiased estimate of the subgradient: the vector (x˜− x̂) satisfies E [x˜− x̂] = (x∗(p)− x̂)
because the noise vector is drawn from N (0, I). This is sufficient to allow us to analyze LearnLead as
stochastic gradient descent. The principal does the following: initialize p1 = 0 and at each round t ∈ [T ],
observes a realized contribution vector x˜t = x∗(pt) + θt and updates the contract prices as follows:
pt+1 = ΠP
[
pt + η(x˜t − x̂)] ,
where each θt ∼ N (0, I), η is a learning rate and P = {p ∈ Rd+ | ‖p‖ ≤
√
d}; Finally, the algorithm
outputs the average price vector p̂ = 1/T
∑T
t=1 p
t
. We use the following standard theorem about the
convergence guarantee for stochastic gradient descent (a more general result can be found in [NJLS09]).
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Lemma 30. With probability at least 1 − β, the average vector p̂ output by stochastic gradient descent
satisfies
max
p∈P
g(p)− g(p̂) ≤ O
(√
d√
T
(
γ +
√
d log
(
Td
β
)))
.
Algorithm 5 Learning the price vector from noisy observations: LearnPriceN(x̂, ε, β)
Input: A target contribution x̂ ∈ C , target accuracy ε, and confidence parameter β
Initialize: restricted price space P = {p ∈ Rd+ | ‖p‖ ≤
√
d}
p1j = 0 for all j ∈ [d] T = O˜
(
dγ2
ε4σ2
)
η =
√
2γ√
d
√
T
For t = 1, . . . , T :
Observe the realized contribution by the agent x˜t = x∗(pt) + θ, where θ ∼ N (0, I)
Update price vector:
p˜t+1j = p
t
j + η
(
x̂j − x˜tj
)
for each j ∈ [d], pt+1 = ΠP
[
p̂t+1
]
Output: p̂ = 1/T
∑T
t=1 p
t.
Lemma 31. Let x̂ ∈ C be any target contribution vector. Then, with probability at least 1−β, the algorithm
LearnPriceN(x̂, ε, β) outputs a contract price vector p̂ for the principal such that the induced contribution
vector x∗(p̂) satisfies
‖x̂− x∗(p̂)‖ ≤ ε,
and the number observations on the realized contributions of the agent it needs is no more than
T = O˜
(
dγ2
ε4σ2
)
.
6.2 Optimizing the Principal’s Utility
Finally, we show how to optimize the principal’s utility by combining LearnPriceN and ZOO.
Following from the same analysis of Lemma 9, we know that the principal’s utility-maximizing price
vector to induce expected contribution x̂ is ∇c(x̂). We can then rewrite the expected utility of the principal
as a function of the attempted contribution of the agent:
up(x) = 〈v −∇c(x), x〉.
Since c is a homogeneous and convex function, by Theorem 10, up is a concave function.
Similar to Section 3.5, we will run ZOO to optimize over the interior subset:
Cδ = (1− 2δ)C + δ1,
so any price vector p̂ given by LearnPriceN is the unique price that induces the agent’s attempted contri-
bution vector x∗(p̂) (Lemma 17). By the same analysis of Lemma 20, we know that there is little loss in
principal’s utility by restricting the contribution vectors to Cδ.
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Lemma 32. The function up : C → R is 2-Lipschitz, and for any 0 < δ < 1,
max
x∈C
up(x)−max
x∈Cδ
up(x) ≤ 6δγ.
Now we show how to use LearnPriceN to provide an noisy evaluation for up at each point of Cδ (scale
of δ determined in the analysis). For each p̂ the LearnPriceN returns, the realized contribution vector we
observe is x˜ = x∗(p̂) + θ, so the utility experienced by the principal is
up(p̂, x˜) = 〈v − p̂, x˜〉.
We first demonstrate that up(p̂, x˜) gives an unbiased estimate for up, and we can obtain an accurate estimate
by taking the average of a small number realized utilities. In the following, let constant a = ln 2/(2π).
Lemma 33. Let x′ ∈ C be the contribution vector such that p′ = ∇c(x′) is the unique price vector that
induces x′. Let noise vectors θ1, . . . , θs ∼ N (0, I) and x˜j = x′+ θj for each j ∈ [s]. Then with probability
at least 1− β, ∣∣∣∣∣∣1s
s∑
j=1
up(p̂, x˜
j)− up(x′)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
√
d
s
√
2
a
ln
2
β
.
Proof. Let b = v − p′, then we can write
1
s
s∑
j=1
up(p̂, x˜
j)− up(x′) = 1
s
s∑
j=1
(〈b, x˜j〉 − 〈b, x′〉)
=
1
s
s∑
j=1
〈b, θj〉
=
1
s
s∑
j=1
d∑
i=1
biθ
j
i
Note that each θji is sampled from the Gaussian distribution N (0, 1), and we use the fact that if X ∼
N (0, σ21) and Y ∼ N (0, σ22) then (bX+cY ) ∼ N (0, b2σ21+c2σ22). We can further derive that 1s
∑s
j=1
∑d
i=1 biθ
j
i
is a random variable with distribution N (0, ‖b‖2/s). Then we will use the following fact about Gaussian
tails: let Y be a random variable sampled from distribution N (0, ι2) and a = ln 2/(2π), then for all ζ > 0
Pr [|Y | > ζ] ≤ 2 exp (−aζ2/ι2)
It follows that with probability at least 1− β, we have∣∣∣∣∣∣1s
s∑
j=1
d∑
i=1
biθ
j
i
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤
√
ln 2β
as
‖b‖.
Finally, note that we can bound ‖b‖ = ‖v − p′‖ ≤ √2d, so replacing ‖b‖ by √2d recovers our bound.
Now we are ready to give the algorithm to optimize the principal’s utility in Algorithm 6.
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Algorithm 6 Learning the price vector to optimize under noisy observations: OproN(C,α, β)
Input: Feasible bundle space C , target accuracy α, and confidence parameter β
Initialize:
ε =
α
12γ + 3d
δ = 2ε α′ = 3dε β′ = β/2T s =
2d ln 2β′
aε2
restricted bundle space Cδ = (1− 2δ)C + δ1 and number of iterations T = O˜(d4.5)
For t = 1, . . . , T :
ZOO(α′, Cδ) queries the profit for bundle xt
Let pt = LearnPriceN(xt, ε, β′)
For j = 1, . . . s:
Principal post price pt
Let x˜j(pt) be the realized contribution and experiences utility u(pt, x˜j(pt))
Send 1s
∑s
j=1 u(p
t, x˜j(pt)) to ZOO(α′, Cδ) as an approximate evaluation of up(xt)
x̂ = ZOO(α′, Cδ)
p̂ = LearnPrice(x̂, ε)
Output: the last price vector p̂
Theorem 34. Let α > 0 and 0 < β < 1/2. With probability at least 1 − β, the price vector p̂ output by
OproN(C,α, β) satisfies
E [up(p̂, x
∗(p̂))] ≥ max
p∈P
up(p, x
∗(p))− α,
and the number of observations on realized contributions is bounded by
O˜
(
d9.5
α4
)
.
Proof. First, by Lemma 31 and union bound, with probability at least 1− β/2, we have ‖xt − x∗(pt)‖ ≤ ε
for all t ∈ [T ]. We condition on this level of accuracy for the rest of the proof. By the same analy-
sis of Footnote 4, we know that each target contribution x∗(pt) is in the interior IntC , so we have that
up(x
∗(pt)) = up(pt, x∗(pt)).
To establish the accuracy guarantee, we need to bound two sources of error. First, we need to bound the
error from ZOO. Note that the target contribution x∗(pt) satisfies
|up(xt)− up(x∗(pt))| ≤ 2ε.
By Lemma 33 and our setting of s, we have with probability at least 1− β′ that∣∣∣∣∣∣1s
s∑
j=1
up(p
t, x˜j(pt))− up(x∗(pt))
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ ε.
By union bound, we know such accuracy holds for all t ∈ [T ] with probability at least 1−β/2. We condition
on this level of accuracy, then the average utility provides an accurate evaluation for up(xt) at each queried
point xt ∣∣∣∣∣∣1s
s∑
j=1
up(p
t, x˜j(pt))− up(xt)
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≤ 3ε.
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By Lemma 7, we know that the vector x̂ output by ZOO satisfies
E [up(x̂)] ≥ max
x∈Cδ
up(x)− 3dε.
Finally, by Lemma 32 and the value of ε, we also have
E [up(x̂)] ≥ max
x∈C
up(x)− (12εγ + 3dε) = max
x∈C
up(x)− α.
Note maxx∈C up(x) = maxp∈P up(p, x∗(p)), so we have shown the accuracy guarantee. In each itera-
tion, the algorithm requires O˜
(
dγ2
ε4σ2
)
noisy observations for running LearnPriceN and s observations for
estimating up(x∗(pt)), so the total number of observations is bounded by
O˜
(
d4.5 ×
(
γ2d(γ + d)4
σ2α4
+
d(γ + d)2
α2
))
= O˜
(
d9.5
α4
)
where we hide constants σ, γ in the last equality.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have given algorithms for optimally solving a large class of Stackelberg games in which the
leader has only “revealed preferences” feedback about the follower’s utility function, with applications both
to profit maximization from revealed preferences data, and optimal tolling in congestion games. We believe
this is a very natural model in which to have access to agent utility functions, and that pursuing this line
of work will be fruitful. There are many interesting directions, but let us highlight one in particular. In our
profit maximization application, it would be very natural to consider a “Bayesian” version of our problem.
At each round, the producer sets prices, at which point a new consumer, with valuation function drawn from
an unknown prior, purchases her utility maximizing bundle. The producer’s goal is to find the prices that
maximize her expected profit, over draws from the unknown prior. Under what conditions can we solve this
problem efficiently? The main challenge (and the reason why it likely requires new techniques) is that the
expected value of the purchased bundle need not maximize any well-behaved utility function, even if each
individual consumer is maximizing a concave utility function.
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A A Routing Game Where Social Cost is Not Convex in The Tolls
As we stated in the introduction, we can give a simple example of a routing game in which the function
mapping a set of tolls on each of the edges to the social cost of the equilibrium routing in the routing game
induced by those tolls is not a convex function of the tolls. The example is related to the canonical examples
of Braess’ Paradox in routing games.
Let SC (τ1, τ2) be the function that maps a pair of tolls for the two A → B edges to the social cost
(excluding the tolls) of the equilibrium routing. For each of the inputs we consider, the equilibrium will be
unique, so multiplicity of equilibria is irrelevant.
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T
B
4x/10
1/2 4x/10
1/2
1/200 + τ1 τ2
Figure 1: A routing game in which the function mapping tolls to social cost of the unique equilibrium routing is not convex. In
this example, there are n players each trying to route 1/n units of flow from S to T . There are two edges from A to B with tolls τ1
and τ2, and we assume without loss of generality that all other tolls are fixed to 0. Each edge is labeled with the latency function
indicating the cost of using that edge when the congestion on that edge is x ∈ [0, 1]. Note that the latencies (excluding the tolls) on
every edge are bounded in [0, 1].
First, consider the set of tolls τ = τ1 = τ2 = 0. It is not hard to verify that the unique equilibrium is for
every player to use the route S → A→ B → T using the A→ B edge on the right (with latency 0).6 Each
player will experience a total latency of 1 along their route. Thus SC (τ) = 8n/10.
Now consider the tolls τ ′ in which τ1 = 1, τ2 = 2. At these tolls, it is not hard to verify that the unique
equilibrium is for n/2 players to use S → A→ T and half to use S → B → T .7 Every player experiences
a total latency of 2/10 + 1/2 = 7/10. Thus SC (t′) = 7n/10.
Finally, consider the convex combination 99τ/100 + τ ′/100 in which τ1 = 1/100 and τ2 = 1/50. In
this case, the unique equilibrium routing will have every player use the route S → A → B → T but
using the A → B edge on the left (with latency 1/200 and latency-plus-toll 3/200). To see why, observe
that if a player were at A, then no matter what the other players are doing, the cheapest path to T is to
go A → B → T using the left edge (note that the right edge has latency-plus-toll 1/50 whereas the left
edge has latency-plus-toll 3/200). Thus, the cost of going B → T is exactly 1/2 and the cost of going
A → B → T is exactly 1/2 + 3/200. Now, if the player is at S, going S → B → T costs exactly 1,
whereas going S → A → B → T costs at most 4/10 + 1/2 + 3/200 = 183/200 < 1/2. Thus, every
player will choose the path S → A → B → T , using the left A → B edge. Every player experiences a
total latency of exactly 183/200. Thus, SC (t′′) = 183n/200.
6Since the graph is a DAG, we can use backwards induction. From A, it can never cost more to go A → B → T than to go
A → T . Since one can go from A to B for a cost of 0, players are indifferent about ending up at node A and node B. Since
S → A can never cost more than S → B, and players are indifferent between A and B, every player would choose the path
S → A→ B → T (using the 0 latency path from A to B.
7At these tolls, no player will never use either A → B edge. Thus, they will balance the traffic so that S → A → T and
S → B → T have equal cost. By symmetry, half will go through A and half through B.
33
But, since
SC (99τ/100 + τ ′/100) =
183n
200
>
99
100
· 8n
10
+
1
100
· 7n
10
=
99
100
· SC (τ) + 1
100
· SC (τ ′),
we can see that the function SC (τ) is not convex in τ .
B Missing Proofs in Section 3
Lemma 35. Suppose function v : Rd+ → R+ is a concave and homogeneous of some degree k ≤ 0. Then
k ≤ 1.
Proof. First, we show that v(0) = 0. To see this, observe that for any b > 1, we can write v(0) = v(b,0) =
bkv(0). For any x ∈ Rd+ such that x 6= 0, we have the following due to the concavity of v:
v(x)/2 =
1
2
[v(0) + v(x)] ≤ v(x/2) =
(
1
2
)k
v(x).
This means that k ≤ 1.
B.1 Properties of CES and Cobb-Douglas Utilities
In this sub-section, we give proofs showing that both CES and Cobb-Douglas utility functions are strongly
concave and Ho¨lder continuous in the convex region (0,H]d.
B.1.1 Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES)
Consider valuation functions of the form:
v(x) =
(
d∑
i=1
αix
ρ
i
)β
,
where αi > 0 for every i ∈ [d] and ρ, β > 0 such that ρ < 1 and βρ < 1.
Theorem 36. Let C be a convex set such that there exists some constant that H > 0 such that C ⊆
(0,H]d. Then v is R-strongly concave over the C for some constant R and is (((maxi αi)d)β , ρβ)-Ho¨lder
continuous.
Proof. We will derive the Hessian matrix ∇2v of the function v, and show that there exists some fixed
R > 0 such that for every x ∈ C and every y ∈ Rd, we have y⊺∇2v(x)y ≤ −R‖y‖2. First, we have the
first partial derivatives
∂v
∂xi
= β
(
d∑
k=1
αkx
ρ
k
)(β−1) (
ραi x
ρ−1
i
)
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Now we take the second partial derivatives. For any i 6= j,
∂2v
∂xi∂xj
= β(β − 1)
(
d∑
k=1
αkx
ρ
k
)β−2 (
ραjx
ρ−1
j
)(
ραix
ρ−1
i
)
and for any i,
∂2v
∂x2i
= β (β − 1)
(
d∑
k=1
αkx
ρ
k
)β−2 (
ραi x
ρ−1
i
)2
+ β
(
d∑
k=1
αkx
ρ
k
)β−1
(ρ(ρ− 1)αixρ−2i ).
Recall that the ij-th entry of the Hessian matrix is (∇2v)i,j = ∂2v/∂xi∂xj , and we could write
y⊺
(∇2v(x)) y = d∑
i=1
d∑
j=1
∂2v
∂xi∂xj
yiyj
= 2
∑
i 6=j
∂2v
∂xi∂xj
yiyj +
d∑
i=1
∂2v
∂2xi
y2i
= 2β(β − 1)ρ2
∑
i 6=j
αiαj
(
d∑
k=1
αkx
ρ
k
)β−2
(xρ−1i yi)(x
ρ−1
i yj)
+
d∑
i=1
β(β − 1)( d∑
k=1
αkx
ρ
k
)β−2 (
ραix
ρ−1
i yi
)2
+ β
(
d∑
k=1
αkx
ρ
k
)β−1 (
ρ(ρ− 1)αixρ−2i y2i
)
= β(β − 1)ρ2
(
d∑
k=1
αkx
ρ
k
)β−2( d∑
k=1
αkx
ρ−1
k yk
)2
+ βρ(ρ− 1)
(
d∑
k=1
αkx
ρ
k
)β−1( d∑
k=1
αkx
ρ−2
k y
2
k
)
We will first consider the case where β ≤ 1. Then both of the terms above are non-positive , and
y⊺(∇2v(x))y ≤ −βρ(1− ρ)
(
d∑
k=1
αkx
ρ
k
)β−1( d∑
k=1
αkx
ρ−2
k y
2
k
)
≤ −βρ(1− ρ) inf
x∈C

(
d∑
k=1
αkx
ρ
k
)β−1 infk∈[d],x∈C{αkxρ−2k }
(
d∑
k=1
y2k
)
≤ −βρ(1− ρ)
(
d∑
k=1
αkH
ρ
)β−1
min
k
{αk}Hρ−2‖y‖2
= −βρ(1− ρ)
(
d∑
k=1
αk
)β−1
min
k
{αk}Hρβ−2‖y‖2
Thus, y⊺(∇2v(x))y ≤ −R‖y‖2 for R = βρ(1− ρ)
(∑d
k=1 αk
)β−1
mink{αk}Hρβ−2.
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Now we consider the case where β > 1. Since we have assumed that ρβ < 1, we also know that
(β − 1)ρ < 1− ρ. Let κ = (β−1)ρ(1−ρ) and we know that 0 < κ < 1. It follows that
y⊺
(∇2v(x)) y = βρ(1 − ρ)( d∑
k=1
αkx
ρ
k
)β−2 κ( d∑
k=1
αkx
ρ−1
k yk
)2
− κ
(
d∑
k=1
αkx
ρ
k
)(
d∑
k=1
αkx
ρ−2
k y
2
k
)
− βρ(1− ρ)
(
d∑
k=1
αkx
ρ
k
)β−2 [
(1− κ)
(
d∑
k=1
αkx
ρ
k
)(
d∑
k=1
αkx
ρ−2
k y
2
k
)]
(Cauchy-Schwarz) ≤ −βρ(1− ρ)(1 − κ)
(
d∑
k=1
αkx
ρ
k
)β−1( d∑
k=1
αkx
ρ−2
k y
2
k
)
≤ −βρ(1− ρ)(1 − κ)
(
d∑
k=1
αβkx
ρβ−2
k y
2
k
)
≤ −βρ(1− ρ)(1 − κ) inf
k∈[d],x∈C
{
αβkx
ρβ−2
k
}
‖y‖2
≤ −βρ(1− ρ)(1 − κ)min
k
{
αβk
}
Hρβ−2‖y‖2
This means, y⊺(∇2v(x))y ≤ R‖y‖2 for R = βρ(1 − ρ)(1 − κ)mink=1
{
αβk
}
Hρβ−2. Therefore, we have
shown that v is R strongly concave in C for some positive constant R.
Next, we will show that the function is Ho¨lder continuous over C . Let x, y ∈ C such that x 6= y.
Without loss of generality, assume that v(x) ≥ v(y), and let εi = |xi − yi| for each i ∈ [d]. Then we have(∑
i
αix
ρ
i
)β
−
(∑
i
αiy
ρ
i
)β
≤
(∑
i
αi|xi − yi|ρ
)β
≤
(
max
i
αi
)β
·
(∑
i
ερi
)β
≤
(
max
i
αi
)β
· (d‖x− y‖ρ2)β
≤
(
max
i
αi
)β
· dβ ‖x− y‖ρβ2
where the first step follows from the sub-additivity. This shows that the function is (((maxi αi)d)β , ρβ)-
Ho¨lder continuous over C , which completes the proof.
B.1.2 Cobb-Douglas
Consider valuation functions of the form
v(x) =
d∏
i=1
xαii ,
where αi > 0 for every i ∈ [d] and
∑d
i=1 αi < 1.
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Theorem 37. Let C be a convex set such that there exists some constant that H > 0 such that C ⊆ (0,H]d.
Then v is (1,
∑
i αi)-Ho¨lder continuous and R-strongly concave over C for some constant R.
Proof. Similar to the previous proof, we will show that there exists some constant R > 0 such that for every
x ∈ C and every y ∈ Rd, we have y⊺∇2v(x)y ≤ −R‖y‖2. First, we could write down the following first
and second partial derivatives of the function:
∂v
∂xi
= αix
αi−1
i
∏
j 6=i
x
αj
j
∂2v
∂2xi
= αi(αi − 1)xαi−2i
∏
j 6=i
x
αj
j
and for any i 6= j,
∂2v
∂xi∂xj
= αix
αi−1
i αjx
αj−1
j
∏
k 6=i,j
xαkk
Let y ∈ Rd, and let κ =∑di=1 αi ∈ (0, 1).
y⊺(∇2v(x))y =
d∑
i=1
d∑
j=1
yi
∂2v
∂xi∂xj
yj
= 2
∑
i 6=j
∏
k 6=i,j
xαkk (αix
αi−1
i yi)(αjx
αj−1
j yj) +
d∑
i=1
αi(αi − 1)xαi−2i y2i
∏
j 6=i
x
αj
j
=
(
d∏
k=1
xαkk
)2∑
i 6=j
(αix
−1
i yi)(αjx
−1
j yj) +
d∑
i=1
αi(αi − 1)x−2i y2i )

=
(
d∏
k=1
xαkk
)( d∑
i=1
αix
−1
i yi
)2
−
d∑
i=1
αix
−2
i y
2
i

(Cauchy-Schwarz) ≤
(
d∏
k=1
xαkk
)[(
d∑
i=1
αi
)(
d∑
i=1
αix
−2
i y
2
i
)
−
d∑
i=1
αix
−2
i y
2
i
]
≤
(
d∏
k=1
xαkk
)[
κ
(
d∑
i=1
αix
−2
i y
2
i
)
−
d∑
i=1
αix
−2
i y
2
i
]
≤ −
(
d∏
k=1
xαkk
)
(1− κ)
(
d∑
i=1
αix
−2
i y
2
i
)
≤ −H(
∑
k αk−2)(1− κ)min
k
{αk}‖y‖2
Therefore, v is R-strongly concave in C for R = H(
∑
k αk−2)(1− κ)mink{αk}.
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Next, we will show that the function is (1,
∑
i αi)-Ho¨lder continuous. Let x, y ∈ C such that x 6= y.
Without loss generality, assume that v(x) ≥ v(y). We could write
d∏
i=1
xαii −
d∏
i=1
yαii ≤
d∏
i=1
|xi − yi|αi
≤
d∏
i=1
‖x− y‖αi2 = ‖x− y‖
∑
i αi
2
where the first step follows from the sub-additivity of v. This shows that the function is (1,
∑
i αi)-Ho¨lder
continuous, which completes the proof.
C Detailed Analysis of Section 4
Just as in Section 3.4, we start by considering the following convex program associated with x̂
max
x∈AF
φ(x) (14)
such that xj ≤ x̂j for every j ∈ [d] (15)
The Lagrangian of the program is
L(x, p) = φ(x)−
d∑
j=1
pj(xj − x̂j),
where pj is the dual variable for each constraint (15) and the vector p is also interpreted as the action of the
leader. We can interpret the Lagrangian as the payoff function of a zero-sum game, in which the leader is the
minimization player and the follower is the maximization player. To guarantee the fast convergence of our
later use of gradient descent, we will restrict the leader to play actions in Pm as defined in (11). It is known
that such a zero-sum game has value V : the leader has a minimax strategy p∗ such that L(x, p∗) ≤ V for all
x ∈ AF , and the follower has a maxmin strategy x∗ such that L(x∗, p) ≥ V for all p ∈ P. We first state the
following lemma about the value of this zero-sum game.
Lemma 38. The value of the Lagrangian zero-sum game is V = φ(x̂), that is
max
x∈AF
min
p∈P
L(x, p) = min
p∈P
max
x∈AF
L(x, p) = φ(x̂)
Proof. The proof is identical to the proof of Lemma 13.
An approximate minimax equilibrium of a zero-sum game is defined as follows.
Definition 39. Let α ≥ 0. A pair of strategies p ∈ P and x ∈ AF form an α-approximate minimax
equilibrium if
L(x, p) ≥ max
x′∈AF
L(x′, p)− α ≥ V − α and L(x, p) ≤ min
p′∈P
L(x, p′) + α ≤ V + α.
First observe that fixing a strategy x, the maximization player’s best response in this zero-sum game is
the same as the follower’s best response in the Stackelberg game.
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Claim 40. Let p′ ∈ P be any action of the leader, then
arg max
x∈AF
L(x, p′) = x∗(p′)
Proof. We can write
arg max
x∈AF
L(x, p′) = arg max
x∈AF
[
φ(x)− 〈p′, x− x̂〉]
= arg max
x∈AF
[
φ(x)− 〈p′, x〉]
= arg max
x∈AF
UF (p
′, x)
The second equality follows from the fact that 〈p′, x̂〉 is independent of the choice of x.
Now we show that if a strategy pair (p′, x′) is an approximate minimax equilibrium in the zero-sum
game, then p′ approximately induces the target action x̂ of the follower. Hence, our task reduces to finding
an approximate minimax equilibrium of the Lagrangian game.
Lemma 41. Suppose that a pair of strategies (p′, x′) ∈ P ×AF forms an α-approximate minimax equilib-
rium. Then the induced follower action x∗(p′) satisfies ‖x̂− x∗(p′)‖ ≤√4α/σ.
Proof. By the definition of approximate minimax equilibrium, we have
φ(x̂)− α ≤ L(x′, p′) ≤ φ(x̂) + α
and also by 40,
max
x∈AF
L(x, p′)− α = L(x∗(p′), p′)− α ≤ L(x′, p′) ≤ φ(x̂) + α
Note that
L(x̂, p′) = φ(x̂)− 〈p′, x̂− x̂〉 = φ(x̂).
It follows that L(x∗(p′), p′) ≤ L(x̂, p′)+ 2α. Since φ is a σ-strongly concave function, we know that fixing
any leader’s action p, L is also a σ-strongly concave function in x. By Lemma 5 and the above argument,
we have
2α ≥ L(x∗(p′), p′)− L(x̂, p′) ≥ σ
2
‖x∗(p′)− x‖2
Hence, we must have ‖x∗(p′)− x‖ ≤√4α/σ.
To compute an approximate minimax equilibrium, we will use the following T -round no-regret dy-
namics: the leader plays online gradient descent (a “no-regret” algorithm), while the follower selects an
ζ-approximate best response every round. In particular, the leader will produce a sequence of actions
{p1, . . . , pT } against the follower’s best responses {x1, . . . , xT } such that for each round t ∈ [T ]:
pt+1 = ΠP
[
pt − η · ∇pL(xt, pt)
]
and xt = x′(pt).
At the end of the dynamics, the leader has regret defined as
RL ≡ 1
T
T∑
t=1
L(xt, pt)− 1
T
min
p∈P
T∑
t=1
L(xt, p).
Now take the average actions for both players for this dynamics: x = 1T
∑T
t=1 x
t and p = 1T
∑T
t=1 p
t
.
A well-known result by [FS96] shows that the average plays form an approximate minimax equilibrium.
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Theorem 42 ([FS96]). The average action pair (p, x) forms a (RL + ζ)-approximate minimax equilibrium
of the Lagrangian zero-sum game.
To simulate the no-regret dynamics, we will have the following T -round dynamics between the leader
and the follower: in each round t, the leader plays action pt based the gradient descent update and observes
the induced action x∗(pt). The gradient of the Lagrangian ∇pL can be easily computed based on the
observations. Recall from 40 that the follower’s best responses to the leader’s actions are the same in both
the Stackelberg game and the Lagrangian zero-sum game. This means that the gradient of the Lagrangian
can be obtained as follows
∇pL(x∗(p′), p′) =
(
x̂− x∗(p′)) .
In the end, the algorithm will output the average play of the leader 1/T
∑T
t=1 p
t
. The full description of
the algorithm LearnLead is presented in Algorithm 3, and before we present the proof of Theorem 23, we
first include the no-regret guarantee of gradient descent.
Lemma 43 ([Zin03]). Let D be a closed convex set such that ‖D‖ ≤ D, and let c1, . . . , cT be a sequence
of differentiable, convex functions with bounded gradients, that is for every x ∈ D,||∇ct(x)||2 ≤ G. Let
η = D
G
√
T
and ω1 = ΠD [0] be arbitrary. Then if we compute ω1, . . . , ωT ∈ D based on gradient descent
ωt+1 = ΠD
[
ωt − η∇c(ωt)], the regret satisfies
R ≡ 1
T
T∑
t=1
ct(ωt)−min
ω∈D
1
T
T∑
t=1
ct(ω) ≤ GD√
T
(16)
Proof of Theorem 23. We will first bound the regret of the leader in the no-regret dynamics. Each vector of
P has norm bounded by √dλF . Also, since the gradient of the Lagrangian at point p′ is
∇pL(x∗(p′), p′) = (x̂− x∗(p′)),
we then know that the gradient is bounded the norm of AF , which is γ. The regret is bounded by
RL =
√
2dλF γ√
T
.
Let x = 1/T
∑T
t=1 x
∗(pt) denote the average play of the follower. It follows from Theorem 42 that (p̂, x)
forms an (RL + ζ)-approximate minimax equilibrium, and so by Lemma 41, we have
‖x̂− x∗(p̂)‖ ≤
√
4(RL + ζ)
σ
=
√
4
√
2dλF γ
σ
√
T
+
4ζ
σ
.
Plugging in our choice of T , we get ‖x∗(p̂) − x̂‖ ≤ ε/2, and also the total number of observations on the
follower is also T . Finally, by strong concavity of the function φ and Lemma 5, we have that
‖x′(p̂)− x∗(p̂)‖ ≤
√
2ζ
σ
≤ ε/2.
By triangle inequality, we could show that the approximate best-response satisfies ‖x′(p̂)− x̂‖ ≤ ε.
Finally, we give the proof of Theorem 24.
40
Proof of Theorem 24. Since for each xt, the approximate evaluation based on x′(pt) satisfies |ψ(xt) −
ψ(x′(pt))| ≤ λLε, by Lemma 7 we know that the action x̂ output by ZOO(dελL,AF ) satisfies
E [ψ(x̂)] ≥ max
x∈AF
ψ(x) − dελL = max
p∈AL
UL(p, x
∗(p))− dελL.
Finally, we will use LearnLead(x̂, ε) to output a leader action p̂ such that ‖x∗(p̂) − x̂‖ ≤ ε, and so
ψ(x∗(p̂)) ≥ ψ(x̂)− λLε. Therefore, in the end we guarantee that
E [UL(p̂, x
∗(p̂))] = E [ψ(p̂)] ≥ E [ψ(x̂)]− λLε ≥ max
p∈AL
UL(p, x
∗(p))− (d+ 1)ελL.
Plugging in our choice of ε, we recover the α accuracy guarantee. Note that in each iteration, the number of
observations on the follower required by the call of LearnLead is
T ′ = O
(
dλ2F γ
2
ε4σ2
)
Therefore the total number of observations our algorithm needs is bounded by
O
(
T ′ × T ) = O˜(d5.5λ2F γ2
ε4σ2
)
Again plugging in our value of ε, the bound on the number of observations needed is
O˜
(
d9.5λ2Fλ
4
Lγ
2
α4σ2
)
.
Hiding the constants (λF , λL, γ and σ), we recover the bound above.
D Improvement with Ellipsoid in Noiseless Settings
In this section, we present variants of the LearnPrice and LearnLead algorithms that uses the Ellipsoid
algorithm as a first-order optimization method. In particular, this will allow us to improve the dependence
of the query complexity on the target accuracy parameter α. For the technique we give in this section, the
number of observations of the follower’s actions will have a poly-logarithmic dependence on 1/α instead of
a polynomial one. We also improve the polynomial dependence on the dimension.
D.1 The Ellipsoid Algorithm
We will briefly describe the ellipsoid method without going into full detail. Let P ⊂ Rd be a convex
body, and f : P → [−B,B] be a continuous and convex function. Let r,R > 0 be such that the set P is
contained in an Euclidean ball of radius R and it contains a ball of radius r. The ellipsoid algorithm solves
the following problem: minp∈P f(p).
The algorithm requires access to a separation oracle for P: given any p ∈ Rd, it either outputs that x is
a member of P, or if p 6∈ P then it outputs a separating hyperplane between p and P. It also requires access
to a first-order oracle: given any p ∈ Rd, it outputs a subgradient w ∈ ∂f(p). The algorithm maintains an
ellipsoid Et with center ct in Rd over rounds, and in each round t does the following:
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1. If the center of the ellipsoid ct 6∈ P, it calls the separation oracle to obtain a separating hyperplane
wt ∈ Rd such that P ⊂ {p : (p − ct)⊺wt ≤ 0}; otherwise it calls the first-order oracle at ct to obtain
wt ∈ ∂f(ct).
2. Obtain a new ellipsoid Et+1 with center ct+1 based on the ellipsoid Et and vector wt. (See e.g. [Bub14]
for details.) We will treat this ellipsoid update as a black-box step and write it as a function ellip(E, c,w)
that takes an ellipsoid E along with its center c and also a vector w as input and returns a new ellipsoid
E′ with its center c′ as output.
The sequence of ellipsoid centers {ct} produced by the algorithm has the following guarantee.
Theorem 44 (see e.g. [Bub14]). For T ≥ 2d2 log(R/r), the ellipsoid algorithm satisfies {c1, . . . , cT }∩P 6=
∅ and
min
c∈{c1,...,cT }∩P
f(c)−min
p∈P
f(p) ≤ 2BR
r
exp
(
− T
2d2
)
.
In other words, with at most T = O
(
d2 log
(
BR
rε
))
calls to the first-order oracles, the ellipsoid algorithm
finds a point p ∈ ({ct} ∩ P) that is ε-optimal for the function f .
D.2 Learning Prices with Ellipsoid
We will first revisit the problem in Section 3.4 and give an ellipsoid-based variant of LearnPrice that (when
there is no noise) obtains a better query complexity for LearnPrice. Recall that we are interested in com-
puting a price vector p̂ ∈ P such that the induced bundle x∗(p̂) is close to the target bundle x̂.
Recall from Lemma 14 that it is sufficient to find an approximately optimal solution to the Lagrangian
dual function g(p) = argmaxx∈C L(x, p). We will use the ellipsoid algorithm to find such a solution. Note
that the feasible region for prices is given explicitly: P = {p ∈ Rd+ | ‖p‖ ≤
√
dL}, so a separation oracle
for P is easy to implement. Furthermore, we know from Lemma 15 that for any p, we can obtain a gradient
based on the buyer’s purchased bundle: (x̂−x∗(p)) ∈ ∂g(p). This means we have both the separation oracle
and first-order oracle necessary for running ellipsoid. The algorithm LearnPE is presented in Algorithm 7.
Algorithm 7 Learning the price vector to induce a target bundle: LearnPE(x̂, ε)
Input: A target bundle x̂ ∈ IntC , and target accuracy ε
Initialize: restricted price space P = {p ∈ Rd+ | ‖p‖ ≤
√
dL}
c1 = 0 E1 = {p ∈ Rd | ‖p‖ ≤
√
dL} T = 100d2 ln
(
dλvalγ
εσ
)
L = (λval)
1/β
(
4
ε2σ
)(1−β)/β
For t = 1, . . . , T :
while ct 6∈ P then let obtain a separating hyperplane w and let (Et, ct)← ellip(Et, ct, w)
Let pt = ct
Observe the purchased bundle by the consumer x∗(pt)
Update the ellipsoid (Et+1, ct+1)← ellip(Et, ct, (x̂− x∗(pt))):
Output: p̂ = argminp∈{p1,...,pT } ‖x̂− x∗(p)‖
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Theorem 45. Let x̂ ∈ IntC be a target bundle and ε > 0. Then LearnPE(x̂, ε) outputs a price vector p̂
such that the induced bundle satisfies ‖x̂− x∗(p̂)‖ ≤ ε and the number of observations it needs is no more
than
T = O
(
d2 ln
(
dλval γ
εσ
))
Proof. By Lemma 14, it suffices to show that there exists a price vector p̂ ∈ {pt}Tt=1 such that
g(p̂) ≤ min
p∈P
g(p) +
ε2σ
4
.
We will show this through the accuracy guarantee of ellipsoid. Note that the set P is contained in a ball of
radius 2
√
dλval and contains a ball of radius
√
dλval. Furthermore, the Lagrangian dual objective value is
also bounded: for any p ∈ P:
|g(p)| = |max
x∈C
v(x)− 〈p, x− x̂〉|
≤ max
x∈C
v(x) + |〈p, x∗(p)− x̂〉|
≤ λval γ + ‖p‖ · ‖x∗(p)− x̂‖
≤ λval γ +
√
2dλval γ
≤ 2
√
dλval γ
By Theorem 44, the following holds
min
p∈{p1,...,pT }
g(p)− min
p′∈P
g(p′) ≤ ε
2σ
4
.
By Lemma 14, there exists some p ∈ {p1, . . . , pT } such that the resulting bundle x∗(p) satisfies that
‖x̂ − x∗(p)‖ ≤ ε. Since we are selecting p̂ as p̂ = argminp∈{p1,...,pT } ‖x̂ − x∗(p)‖, we must have ‖x̂ −
x∗(p̂)‖ ≤ ε.
Now we could use LearnPE to replace LearnPrice in the algorithm Opro as a sub-routine to induce
target bundles. The following result follows from the same proof of Footnote 4.
Theorem 46. Let α > 0 be the target accuracy. If we replace LearnPrice by LearnPE in our instantiation
of Opro(C,α), then the output price vector p̂ has expected profit
E [[r(p̂)]] ≥ max
p∈Rd
+
r(p)− α,
the number of times it calls LearnPE is bounded by (d4.5 · polylog(d, 1/α)), and the observations the
algorithm requires from the consumer is at most
d6.5 polylog
(
λval, γ,
1
α
,
1
σ
)
.
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Algorithm 8 Learning the toll vector to induce a target flow: LearnTE(f̂ , ε)
Input: A target flow f̂ ∈ F , and target accuracy ε
Initialize: restricted toll space P = {p ∈ Rd+ | ‖p‖ ≤ m}
c1 = 0 E1 = {x ∈ Rd | ‖x‖ ≤ m} T = 100
(
m2 ln
(m
εσ
))
For t = 1, . . . , T :
while ct 6∈ P then let obtain a separating hyperplane w and let (Et, ct)← ellip(Et, ct, w)
Let τ t = ct
Observe the induced flow f∗(τ t)
Update the ellipsoid (Et+1, ct+1)← ellip(Et, ct,−(f̂ − f∗(pt))):
Output: τ̂ = argminτ∈{τ1,...,τT } ‖f̂ − f∗(τ)‖
D.3 Learning Tolls with Ellipsoid
We will also revisit the problem in Section 5. We give a similar ellipsoid-based algorithm to induce target
flow. See Algorithm 8.
Theorem 47. Let f̂ ∈ F be a target bundle and ε > 0. Then LearnTE(f̂ , ε) outputs a toll vector τ̂ such
that the induced flow satisfies ‖f̂ − f∗(τ̂)‖ ≤ ε and the number of observations it needs is no more than
T = O
(
m2 ln
(m
εσ
))
Proof. Let function g be defined as
g(τ) = min
f∈F
Φ(f) + 〈τ, f − f̂〉.
It suffices to show that there exists some τ ′ ∈ {τ1, . . . , τT } such that g(τ ′) ≥ minτ∈P g(τ) − ε2σ2 .
Before we instantiate the accuracy theorem of ellipsoid, note that the set P is contained in a ball of radius
m and contains a ball of radius m/2, and also that the value of g(τ) is bounded for any τ ∈ P:
|g(τ)| = |min
f∈F
Φ(f) + 〈τ, f − f̂〉|
≤ max
f∈F
Φ(f) + max
f∈F
‖f − f̂‖‖τ‖
≤ m+
√
2mm ≤ 2
√
m3
Given that T = 4m2 ln(m/εσ), we know by Theorem 44 that
max
τ ′∈{τ1,...,τT }
g(τ ′)−max
τ∈P
g(τ) ≥ ε
2σ
2
Therefore, the output toll vector satisfies
‖f̂ − f∗(τ̂)‖ ≤ ε.
This completes our proof.
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Finally, with this convergence bound, we could also improve the result of Lemma 28.
Theorem 48. Let α > 0 be the target accuracy. If we replace LearnLead by LearnTE in the instantiation
of LearnOpt(AF , α), then the output toll vector τ̂ and its the induced flow f̂ = f∗(τ̂) is α-approximately
optimal in expectation:
E
[
Ψ
(
f̂
)]
≤ min
f∈F
Ψ(f) + α.
The number of times it calls LearnTE is bounded by (m4.5 · polylog(m, 1/α)), and so the total number of
observations we need on the flow behavior is bounded by
m6.5 polylog
(
λ,
1
α
,
1
σ
)
.
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